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Search for Sentencing Equity:
Sentence Review in
Massachusetts and Connecticut
Hans Zeisel and Shari Seidman Diamond

Grievances and restlessness among convicted prisoners led to legislation-in
1943 in Massachusetts, in 1957 in Connecticut-establishingsentence review
boards composed of three judges of the trial courts of first instance. The
authors explore in these two jurisdictions bow often and under what circumstances sentences are appealed and modified and what effect, if any, these
modifications have on the sentencing practice in the trial courts. They also
appraise the value of the Connecticut requirement that the review board state
the reasons for its decisions. The authors explore the function of the review
boards in the broader context of the need for reducing sentence disparity.

INTRODUCTION
Nowhere is the problem of sentence disparity more acute than in
the American judicial system. Wide sentencing frames, almost complete
discretion of the sentencing judge within those frames, and the lack of
effective guidelines allow sentences to differ widely for no other reason
Hans Zeisel is Professor Emeritus of Law and Sociology, Research Associate, Center for
Studies in Criminal Justice, the University of Chicago; Senior Consultant, American Bar Foundation.
Shari Seidman Diamond is Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice and Psychology, University
of Illinois at Chicago Circle.
This is the second report in fulfillment of a grant for studying institutions designed to
reduce sentence disparity. The first study dealt with the sentencing councils in the federal
courts (see note 4 infra). The grant was made by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice at the University of Chicago Law School.
Additional support for this study was provided by the Nancy G. and Raymond G. Feldman
Fund for Research at the University of Chicago Law School. The project was cheerfully and
patiently administered by our colleague Franklin E. Zimring. In Massachusetts our thanks for
cooperation and information go to John Fiske, the executive secretary of the superior court; C.
Eliot Sands, commissioner of probation; John O'Connor, chief probation officer for Suffolk
County; John Burke, assistant executive secretary of the superior court; James P. McGuire, chief
probation officer for Middlesex County; Daniel Jaffe of the Criminal History Systems Board;
and Daniel Cooper, who coded the cases. In Connecticut we were greatly aided by Paul Paulten,
executive secretary to the Appellate Review Division, and by Pamela Samuelson, who coded and
contributed to the analysis of the results with help from Stephen Frazzini. We also owe thanks
to the Computation Center of the University of Illinois, Chicago, for dependable assistance in
the data analysis.
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than that the one was set by Judge A and the other by Judge B. 1 And
since as a rule a sentence cannot be appealed unless the conviction itself
is attacked, these disparate sentences stand-a matter of concern to the
offender, the judge, and the criminal justice system as a whole. The fact
of sentence disparity is well established, but until recently the size of
such disparities had not been known. 2
Two studies have recently supplied convincing data on the amount
of sentence disparity. In 1974 the Federal Judicial Center published an
experiment in which the judges in the Second Federal Circuit were
asked to read summaries and presentence reports in 20 selected cases
and indicate the sentence they would give in each. 3 Although the study
was designed to find out whether some judges were generally more
severe than others, the data allowed us to determine the extent to
which sentences varied among judges. The potential objection to such a
study was that the results of the simulated situation would not necessarily reflect the real situation. That objection was to a great extent
avoided in another effort to study sentence disparity in the federal
courts, conducted in partial fulfillment of the present grant; it evaluated
the sentencing councils in two of the four federal district courts in
which the councils now operate. 4 In these courts the trial judge, before
pronouncing sentence, confers with some of his colleagues to find out
what sentence they would impose in the particular case. Except for
personal acquaintance with the defendant, these colleagues are provided
1. Cf. Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1973).
2. Some studies compared overall sentencing patterns across judges on the assumption that
random assignment of cases produced comparable sets of offenders and offenses for each judge
to sentence (e.g., Frederick Gaudet, Individual Differences in the Sentencing of Judges, 32 Arch.
Psychology 1 (1938); George Everson, The Human Element in Justice, 10 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 90 (1919)). In practice, considerations of court management (e.g., bypassing a judge
already burdened with one or more long trials) or simple carelessness may interfere with a
random assignment rule. In addition if judges differ in their rates of conviction or their rates of
guilty plea, their mix of cases will differ at sentencing even if random assignment of cases has
been strictly followed.
Other studies attempted to identify comparable cases assigned to different judges by holding
constant characteristics likely to affect the sentence (e.g., offense, offender record). These
studies (e.g., Edward Green, Judicial Attitudes in Sentencing: A Study of the Factors Underlying the Sentencing Practice of the Criminal Court of Philadelphia (Cambridge Studies in
Criminology vol. 15) (London: Macmillan, 1961); Roger Hood, Sentencing in Magistrates'
Courts: A Study in Variations of Policy 123 (Library of Criminology, Delinquency, and Deviant
Social Behaviour No. 7) (London: Stevens & Sons, 1962)) could always be criticized on the
grounds that no two cases are ever alike and hence any differences might be due to cases rather
than differences between judges.
3. Anthony Partridge & William B. Eldridge, The Second Circuit Sentencing Study: A
Report to the Judges of the Second Circuit (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1974).
4. Shari Seidman Diamond & .Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity and Its Reduction, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 109 (1975).
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with all the documents and facts potentially related to the sentencing
decision which are available to the trial judge. All participating judges,
therefore, come as close to making a real sentencing decision as judges
ever will, short of replacing the single trial judge by a collegium of
judges.
The study found that the sentences imposed by two judges chosen
at random from the court differed on the average by 37 percent of the
mean of the two in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, and by 46 percent of the mean of the two in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.5
Since the latter was one of the courts in which the Federal Judicial
Center study was carried out, we could compare the disparity figures
from our sentencing council data with the simulated experiment. The
juxtaposition gave startling support to our results: Federal Judicial Center experiment-48 percent; sentencing council data-46 percent.6 The
identity in outcome buttresses the finding and also tends to validate the
method of measuring disparity with the aid of simulated sentencing.
The sentencing councils in the federal courts, incidentally, proved to be
of little help. They reduced the original disparity by only a modest
amount: in the Chicago court, from 37 percent to 33 percent; in the
New York court, from 46 percent to 41 percent. 7
The present study examines another of the few existing remedies
for sentence disparity: the appeal of sentences to a Sentencing Review
Board composed of three trial judges from the courts of first instance.
Massachusetts invented the institution, and Connecticut followed suit
with one important additional innovation: the Connecticut review division is required to give reasons for its decisions. Since this is one of the
few places in the American legal system in which sentence decisions
must be supported by a written opinion,' it was an opportunity to
learn something about the potential usefulness of that requirement.
I.

SUMMARY

History
Grievances and restlessness among convicted prisoners led to legislation, in 1943 in Massachusetts, in 1957 in Connecticut, which estab5. With the mean of the two sentences equaling 100 percent. Id. at 123, table 6.
6. Id. at 146, table 27.
7. Id. at 137.
8. Maine requires trial judges to give reasons at original sentencing. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
15, secs. 2141-2144 (Supp. 1975). Maryland requires statements of reasons in all appealed cases.
Md. Ann. Code art. 27, sees. 645JA-645JG (1976), rule 762 (1977).
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lished a sentence review division that consists of three judges of the trial
courts of first instance, and all offenders sent to prison may ask for
review. The board may reduce the sentence, but may also increase it.
Connecticut has not increased a sentence since 1963.
Frequency of Appeal
As table 1 shows, frequency of appeal varies with the severity of
the original sentence; it also varies depending on whether the sentence
was imposed after a guilty plea or after trial.
TABLE 1
Frequency of Appeal and Modification by Severity of Sentence
and Type of Conviction (Percent)
Massachusetts
Over 5 Years

Up to 5 Years
(Below the
Normal Level of
Consideration)
No appeal ......
Appeal ........

After
Guilty Plea

After Trial

81.0
19.0

61.8
38.2

97.7
2.3

Affirmed .....
Reduced ......
Increased .....
Total .......
% Share

Total
68.8
31.2
3
100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

(100)

.......

Connecticut
Up to 3 Years
(Below the
Normal Level of
Consideration)
No appeal ......
Appeal ........

89.0
11.0

Over 3 Years
After
Guilty Plea

After Trial

75.2
24.8

48.0
52.0

% Share

83.1
16.9
7
2

Affirmed .....
Reduced ......
Increased .....
Total .......

Total

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0
(100)

.......

Sentences up to 5 years in Massachusetts and up to 3 years in
Connecticut are hardly ever modified and hence seldom appealed. In
both states these two groups, in fact excluded from review, form over
one-half of all sentences the law made eligible for review.
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Sentences above these limits are appealed with some frequency,
roughly twice as often after trial as after a guilty plea; of the Massachusetts sentences, 19 percent after guilty plea and 38 percent after trial;
of the Connecticut sentences, 25 percent after guilty plea and 52 percent after trial.
Frequency of Modification
The overall modification rates are small in both states, primarily
because sentences up to 3 years in Connecticut and up to 5 years in
Massachusetts are hardly ever modified. Of all eligible sentences,
Massachusetts reduced 2.3 percent and increased 0.2 percent, while Connecticut reduced 1.2 percent and increased none.
The modification rates are larger if computed for the sentences
above the 3-year and 5-year limits. In Massachusetts roughly 5 percent
of these sentences are reduced; the rate is not greater after trial than
after guilty plea. In Connecticut, if one may trust the small sample of
trials, the modification rate after trial is 8 percent, as against 3 percent
after guilty plea.
Sentence Increases
Even the occasional upward modification of sentences by the
Massachusetts Review Board, we assume, reduces disparity. What the
appellant perceives as too high a sentence may be seen by the board as
too low a sentence when compared to similar cases. These sentence
increases are nevertheless problematic. The review board sees only sentences which the offender considers to be on the high side. Offenders
who are satisfied with their sentences because they consider them adequate or even lenient do not appeal. The board, therefore, does not see
the bulk of cases that may deserve upward revision. The disparities the
board tries to correct by upward revisions all fall into the high sentence
range of over 5 years. It is difficult to lose the feeling that the board
deems it necessary to increase a sentence once in a while to keep this
right from degenerating into a paper threat.
Sentencing Levels
Massachusetts prison sentences are on the whole considerably
higher than prison sentences in Connecticut. Whether this indicates a
generally more severe sentencing practice depends on the to-us-unknown
proportion of defendants not sent to prison.
HeinOnline -- 1977 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 887 1977
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The higher proportion of convictions after trial in Massachusetts
(30 percent) than in Connecticut (5 percent) may conceivably reflect
different practices of plea bargaining.
Reasons for Modifications
A few sentencing principles have been established by the boards.
One is that codefendants with similar criminal records and equal share
of guilt should receive similar sentences unless they can be distinguished, e.g., by a codefendant's having turned state's evidence (Connecticut and Massachusetts); or that the sentence for a juvenile should
not be greater than the sentence an adult could have received had he
been convicted of that crime (Connecticut).
In both states the most frequent reason for reducing a sentence is
the review board's Gestalt perception that a particular sentence is out of
line with the sentences ordinarily imposed for that particular crimeoffender combination.
Connecticut Requires Reasons
Requiring the board to write opinions, as Connecticut does, is
potentially useful; opinions could become precedents, leading to guidelines. As presently written, the opinions seldom serve that purpose.
More often than not they fail to articulate the reasons for rejecting or
allowing the appeal, most probably because such articulation is difficult.
Composition of the Board
Some judges have more severe sentencing standards than others.
Much depends, therefore, on the composition of the board. The Connecticut provisions recommend themselves; there, the trial court judges
take turns in serving 3-year terms on the board. On a staggered basis,
this gives each judge the opportunity to be associated during his term
with four different colleagues. Such association, which eventually would
involve all trial judges, might by itself increase the judges' awareness of
their colleagues' sentencing views.
The Board's Direct Effect
The original amount of sentence disparity in Massachusetts and
Connecticut (or for that matter in any state court) has not been measured. Such measures have been developed only for some federal courts.
There the sentences of two judges, randomly selected from the court,
sentencing the same case independently, will on the average differ by
HeinOnline -- 1977 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 888 1977

No. 4

SERACH FOR SENTENCING EQUITY

889

around 40 percent. Disparity in the state courts could be smaller
because the crimes there are more homogeneous; moreover, if the prosecutor's office has influence on the sentencing process, it might reduce
disparity. But if disparity in the state courts is anywhere near that in
the federal courts, the 1 or 2 percent reductions by the review boards
can make but a dent.
The Board's Indirect Effect
The most interesting question is whether the review board through
its decisions contributes to a more general reduction of sentence disparity by allowing trial judges to see and comply with the board's
standards. The present study was not designed to explore whether such
a learning process takes place; only observance of sentencing pattern of
individual judges over time in relation to reversals of their sentences by
the board would provide the pertinent data. The modest evidence from
the present study suggests that this indirect effect of the board is at
best minimal. There are too few reductions per judge and there is hardly any effort to establish general standards from which the judges could
learn.
In Massachusetts only the judge's own reversals-few and far between-come to his attention. In Connecticut the judges also have access
to published opinions, but these appear infrequently; moreover, few of
these opinions convey guidelines. It is difficult to see how even a judge
eager to comply with the board's views can read them. The Massachusetts board gives no reasons, and our analysis has shown how difficult it
is to infer reasons from the record. Connecticut, although it states reasons, fares not much better; more often than not the stated reasons are
none.
The rare direct contacts of the trial judge with the decisions of the
review board and the lack of specificity of reasoning in these cases
make it improbable that messages are received by the trial judge that
will change his future sentencing pattern.
The Search for Equity
A judge's first concern in pronouncing sentence is with the sentence's "vertical" justice, that it be just in terms of the judge's own
scale of standards and values. Since that scale will vary from judge to
judge, the requirement of "lateral" justice-of avoiding sentence disparity-arises. The problem is to reconcile the two conflicting requirements. Ultimately, sentencing guidelines should provide the solution.
Their development must start with discovering and making explicit the
HeinOnline -- 1977 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 889 1977
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sentencing pattern now prevalent in any given court system. That pattern should be made visible and eventually be used in the formulation
of guidelines. They should involve narrower sentencing frames for corresponding narrower crime-offender combinations. The pioneering work
of Leslie Wilkins has stimulated our thinking and an interim solution
has been proposed that would provide continuous visibility of the disparity problem and of the need for lateral sentencing justice.
II.

HISTORY

Soon after the first state prison in Massachusetts opened in 1805,
complaints about disparity in sentencing began to accumulate. 9 Some
fifty years later Governor Nathaniel Banks recommended as remedy "an
appeal to the full bench of the court in which sentence was pronounced, and authority given to lessen its rigor."' I But it took almost
another century until 1942, when after some unrest in its prisons,
Massachusetts initiated action that eventually led to an appellate review
procedure. The Judicial Council of Massachusetts recommended that an
''appellate session" of the Superior Court be established for review of
sentences.'' The council's report drew on the American Law Institute's
model criminal code of 193012 but left open the exact form the review
procedure should take.
In the following year, 1943, Massachusetts passed the statute' 3
that created the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, with the
authority to review all sentences to state prison of 2 years or more.
That statute has undergone only minor alterations. A 1945 amendment 1 4 made women sentenced to the reformatory for over 5 years
also eligible for sentence appeal. A second 1945 enactment made sentence appeal retroactively available for 2 years to inmates serving prison
sentences imposed before the review division had been created." Apart
from three other minor technical changes, 1 6 the provisions of the law
have not changed.'"
9. Edwin Powers, The Basic Structure of the Administration of Criminal justice in Massachusetts 120 (6th ed. Boston: Massachusetts Correctional Association, 1973).
10. The governor's address to the Executive Council, Jan. 11, 1859, in 1858-59 Mass. Acts
at 584.
11. Eighteenth Report, Judicial Council of Massachusetts, 28-30, Public Document No. 144,
1942.
12. ALI Code of Criminal Procedure sec. 459 (June 15, 1930, Draft).

13. 1943 Mass. Acts ch, 558, sec. 1.
14. 1945 Mass. Acts ch. 255, secs. 1-3. See note 31 infra.
15. Id. ch. 437.
16. 1955 Mass. Acts ch. 770, sec. 91, 1957 Mass. Acts ch. 777, sec. 36, changed the term
used to refer to the "warden" to principal officer and then to "superintendent," 1968 Mass.
Acts ch. 666, secs. 1-4, eliminated the former (never used) "leave to appeal" provisions and gave
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Connecticut followed the example of Massachusetts in 1956, also
after a series of militant uprisings at the prison during the summer
months of that year. The governor appointed a committee to investigate
the reasons for prisoner unrest and to propose legislation that would
remedy legitimate prisoner grievances. The committee discovered that
prisoners compared their sentences with those of fellow inmates and
often complained of alleged inequities in the penalties imposed on similar offenders for similar offenses.'8 At that time, the recipients of the
harsher penalties had no way to challenge them as arbitrary or unreasonable because the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, like other
courts across the land, had consistently refused to review a sentence
unless it was in excess of the statutory maximum.1 9 The committee
investigated and found "a marked variation in the sentences of prisoners
who have substantially similar backgrounds and have been convicted of
the same offense." ' 2 0 The committee cautioned that the issue was not
so much whether actual disparity existed but rather that the prisoners
believed it to exist: "As long as a prisoner feels that he has been denied
review of a sentence which he deems unfair or unduly harsh, he remains
a source of trouble in the prison system and efforts toward rehabilitation are seriously impeded." 2 ' The committee, therefore, recommended
to the legislature that it establish a Sentence Review Division to which
prisoners could apply for review.
The structure of the review division recommended by the committee and eventually adopted by the legislature was modeled on the
Massachusetts system: 2 2 (1) the board would consist of three trial court
judges; (2) a judge who had imposed the original sentence could not
participate in its review; (3) only the defendant, not the prosecutor, had

the appellate division the power to impose a modification instead of removing it for modification to the superior court.
17. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 278, sec. 28A (Michie/Law. Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1977).
18. Connecticut Prison Study Committee, First Interim Report 1 (unpublished; Nov. 19,
1956) (hereinafter referred to as First Report).
19. State v. Horton, 132 Conn. Supp. 276, 43 A.2d 744 (1945); State v. La Porta, 140
Conn. Supp. 610, 102 A.2d 885 (1954).
20. First Report, supra note 18, at 3. The committee did a pilot investigation of 200 files at
Wethersfield Prison. Concentrating on sentences of those convicted of robbery with violence, the
committee found:
Among prisoners with a record of more than 1 major offense, sentences range from a low
of 8 to 12 years to a high of 15 to 22 years. Among prisoners with a record of only
minor offenses, sentences range from a low of 1 to 3 years to highs of 10 to 12 and 8 to
15 years. Among prisoners with no record of prior convictions, sentences range from a
low of 1 to 3 to a high of 8 to 12 years.
Id.
21. Id. at 1.
22. Id.
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the right to apply for review; 2 3 (4) the tribunal could require the
sentencing judge to provide a written statement of reasons for his
original sentence; and (5) the tribunal would have the power to increase
as well as reduce a sentence. 2 4 In addition, and in contrast to Massachusetts, the Connecticut review division would be required to write
an opinion in each decided case, and these opinions were to be published in an official volume of Connecticut Judicial Decisions.2" There
was one other difference. The three members of the Massachusetts division are appointed "from time to time"; 2 6 the present ones have been
serving since 1973, when the members of the previous panel were
forced to resign because a mandatory retirement age of 70 had been
established for Massachusetts judges. 2 7 The Connecticut panel members
serve three-year terms on a rotating basis.
The Connecticut legislature, with almost no opposition, enacted
the sentence review bill in May 1957.2" The right to apply for review
was made retroactive so that prisoners who had participated in the 1956
incidents of unrest could take advantage of the newly created right to
review. The major purpose of the statute, as its proponents depicted it,
was to lessen the potential for resentment among prisoners who thought
their sentences unfair.2 9
III.

THE REVIEW PROCEDURE

Massachusetts
In Massachusetts every defendant sentenced to state prison to serve
a term of 2 years or more not mandated by law3 or committed to
23. The committee thought allowing the state to apply for review of sentences would violate
the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution. Id., Appendix.
24. The appendix to the committee's First Report argued that to give the division power to
increase sentences would not violate the double jeopardy clause.
25. First Report, supra note 18, at 10-11.
26. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 278, sec. 28A (Michie/Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1977).
27. Mass. Const. sec. 244, art. 98 amendments (1972).
28. 1957 Conn. Pub. Acts, Jan. Sess., P.A. 436. The first statute did not provide the

division with power to increase sentences. The act was amended in September 1957 to provide
that the division could increase sentences. Conn. Pub. Acts, Sept. Spec. Sess., P.A. 14.
29. Minutes of proceedings before the Joint Committee on the Judiciary and Governmental

Functions, Feb. 28, 1957, at 404. See also comments by Representative Koskoff at the same
hearing, at *374, and comments in House Proceedings, May 17, 1957, at 2379.

30. All sentences to state prison must be at least 21h years with two exceptions. The first
occurs when a prisoner is already serving a state prison sentence at the time of the act in which
case a 1-year minimum is permissible (Mass. Laws Ann. ch. 279, sec. 26 (Michie/Law. Co-op
1968)). The second is on a second or subsequent conviction of violation of general drug laws
leading to harmful drugs when a 2-year minimum is allowed (Mass. Laws Ann. ch. 94C, sec. 32
(Law. Co-op 1975)). Only 2 of 443 prison sentences in 1971 had minimums below 2 years.
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the Women's Reformatory for 5 years or more has a right to apply for
sentence review.3
At the outset, hearings were held in Boston and at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution in Norfolk, but currently they are conducted in the basement of the Wrentham district courthouse, which is
close to Walpole State Prison. Sessions are generally held twice a year,
when the clerk of the Appellate Division notifies the chief justice that
there are enough appeals on file to warrant a meeting. The division has
sat for an average of about 16 days per year since it began reviewing
cases in 1944.32
The offender who receives a sentence eligible for review is notified
by the clerk of the trial court at the time of sentencing and then has
ten days to file an-appeal. The execution of the sentence is not stayed
by the filing of an appeal. If an appeal is filed, the trial court judge is
notified and given the opportunity to submit his reasons for imposing
the sentence, or the judge may be requested by the Appellate Division
to provide such a statement. Neither hardly ever happens.
The proceedings before the division are informal. Although the
defendant is generally represented by his counsel, 3 3 the district attorney is generally a representative of the county whose cases are being
heard on that day and is not necessarily the prosecutoir in the particular
case. A member of the county probation office will also usually be
present. No court reporter takes notes and there is no record of the
hearings. The judges have generally reviewed a summary of the case
record and the report of the probation department before the hearing
begins.
The offender is then brought in, and the clerk reads the indictment, the verdict, and the imposed sentence. The chairman of the division reminds the appellant that the division has the power both to raise
and to lower sentences; and, when it is ascertained that this is understood, defense counsel proceeds with the argument. 3 4 No witnesses are
called, but letters and affidavits may be submitted. The prosecutor
31. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 278, sec. 28A (Michie/Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1977). The
discrimination against women is avoided by the practice of sentencing women to "prison" and
specifying that their sentence is to be served at the reformatory.
32. 1966 and 1967 are omitted because of missing data. Computed from annual reports to
the justice of the supreme judicial court by the executive secretary supplemented by Daniel
Bort, Criminal Sentence Appeal in Massachusetts (Unpublished paper, Harvard Law School,
1974).
33. This is his right (Petition of Croteau, 353 Mass. 736, 234 N.E.2d 737 (1968)), although
on rare occasions it may be waived.
34. In the hearings I viewed (S.D.) this warning resulted in several withdrawals. These
cannot be distinguished in the division or county records from withdrawals for other reasons.
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responds, there is an opportunity for rebuttal, and members of the
division frequently question the attorneys. The offender has an opportunity to address the division, then the hearing ends. After several cases
are heard, the division; meets in executive session. If a sentence is
modified, the appellant and counsel are recalled and the new sentence is
announced to them. Otherwise, counsel is told that the appeal is being
"taken under advisement," which in practice means that it has been
dismissed.
Connecticut
In Connecticut, every defendant sentenced to serve a prison or
reformatory term of 1 year or more has the right to apply for review of
that sentence." Application must be made within 30 days after sentencing. As in Massachusetts, the right is the defendant's alone; the
state's attorney may not appeal. As in Massachusetts, the division has
the power to increase the sentence.3 6 An appeal of the sentence does
not stay its execution, 37 but review is relatively prompt, occurring
38
usually within four to six months after sentencing.
Defendants whose sentences are reviewed are entitled to be represented during oral argument by their attorneys and by the state's attorney. Defendants, if they wish, may also make personal statements to
the division.
Review hearings have always been conducted at the prison or reformatory, with about 25 cases scheduled for each session. A few days
before the hearing, each judge receives a folder containing synopses
prepared by the executive secretary of the division 3 9 of all cases to be
reviewed at that session and the full file on some offenders. Although
sentencing judges can be required to submit reasons for their sentence,
in practice this is never done. 4 0 There are occasions when a sentencing
judge, notified that a defendant sentenced by him has filed an appeal,

35. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. sec. 51-195 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
36. See id. sec. 51-196.
37. See id. sec. 51-195.

38. The defendant can delay the review hearing if he wishes. In the sample of sentence
review applicants of 1972, 114 had hearings four to six months after the application was filed;
27 waited seven months or more.

39, The duties of the executive secretary include: (1) making sure the file for each applicant
is complete; (2) assigning cases for hearings; (3) assuring representation by counsel of the
applicant; (4) notifying defendants, attorneys, judges, and corrections officers when hearings will
be held; (5) notifying when applications are untimely; (6) attending sentence review hearings;

and (7) distributing the opinions.
40. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. sec. 51-195 (West Cum. Supp. 1977). This is in part because
sentencing hearing transcripts are available to review division.
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will write to the division explaining the sentence; in at least one case
such an explanation supported the appeal. The judges do not limit the
amount of time any participant may speak during the hearing-hearings
lasting anywhere from five minutes to an hour and a half. After all
cases are heard for the day, the judges go into executive session, with
each judge being assigned to write the opinion in one-third of the cases.
The opinions are rarely longer than two pages and follow a standard formula: a statement that this defendant was convicted after a
guilty plea or a trial for a certain offense or offenses; recitation of the
statutory penalty for the offense(s); what the imposed sentence was;
whether the charge was reduced or other counts nolle prossed or dismissed or both; a brief description of the facts of the offense(s); a
statement about the offender's prior criminal record; remarks about the
offender's character, habits and social adjustment; a conclusion that the
sentence is fair and should stand or is excessive under the circumstances. Not all opinions are this complete; some contain more detail
than others.
Within three or four weeks the opinion usually has been written
and is distributed to the defendant, his counsel, the state's attorney, the
sentencing judge, and a few other persons. 4 1 If the sentence is ordered
modified or the defendant is ordered released, the process is expedited.
IV.

THE STUDY DESIGN

This study was designed to find out how often and under what
circumstances sentence appeals are filed in Massachusetts and Connecticut, 4 2 when and why they result in a modification of the sentence. To
the extent that it was possible we also wanted to find out what effect
the review procedures have on the sentencing practice of the trial
courts. We have paid special attention to the unique feature of the
Connecticut system that requires reasoned written opinions in each case
as to why a sentence was or was not modified.
The Massachusetts sample of cases consisted of all offenders sentenced to state prison (and therefore eligible for sentence review) between November 1, 1972, and December 31, 1973, in two major

41. Other parties to whom opinions are regularly sent are: the chief justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court, the state's attorney in Hartford, the warden of the institution at which the
prisoner is confined, the supreme court reporter, the state library, and, if it is to be published,
to the Hartford Times and Hartford Courant.
42. The only prior study of appellate review of sentences in Connecticut was published 18
years ago. See Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Case
Study, 69 Yale L.J. 1453, 1464 (1960).
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Massachusetts counties-Suffolk and Middlesex-which generate approximately one-half of all Massachusetts prison sentences. After adding an
additional sample of appealed cases, the analysis is based on 775 units,
the appropriately weighted sample of 436 cases. 4 3
In Connecticut we recorded and analyzed all appeals filed with the
Sentence Review Division in 1962, 1967, and 1972, including both
superior and circuit court cases. In addition, to learn something about
the cases eligible for appeal in which no appeal was filed, we took three
samples of 75 cases each from the files of three principal superior
courts-Hartford, New Haven, and Fairfield-which together account for
more than half of the state's superior court business. We thus have a
complete representation of all appeals filed in the years 1962, 1967,
and 1972 (496 cases). We also have, based on a sample, all eligible
defendants for the 1972 sentences in-the three above-mentioned courts.
Thus the Connecticut analysis is based on 918 units, the appropriately

43. The following table presents a synopsis of the Massachusetts cases in this study:
TABLE A
Suffolk County

Middlesex County

(a) Nov. 1, 1972-Dec. 31,
1973 .................
(nonapplicants) .........
(applicants) ............
(b) additional sample with
suspended sentences (all
nonapplicants), Oct.
1972 ..................

107
(75)-6 suspended
(32)

299
(210)
(89)

7
(c) additional applicant sample

(c) additional applicant sample

(Oct. 1973, Apr. & Sept.

(Oct. 1973, Apr. & Sept.

1974) ................

(a) Nov. 1, 1972-Dec. 31,
1973 .................
(nonapplicants) .........
(applicants) ............

14

1974) ................

79

(a) The Massachusetts sample was obtained from the probation office records of Suffolk and
Middlesex counties for the 14 months between Nov. 1, 1972, and Dec. 31, 1973 (see table A).
(b) Middlesex County only: Since the probation files in Middlesex recorded suspended sentences for only 3 of the 14 months (recording stopped after Jan. 1973), additional suspended
sentence cases were obtained from Oct. 1972. The 13 suspended sentences were then weighted
by 14/4 to account for the omissions in the sample between Feb. 1973 and Dec. 31, 1973.
(14/4 X 13) + 101 = 147 units.
(c) Since the majority of those eligible for appeal do not take their cases to the review
board, an additional sample of applicants was drawn so that this group could be examined in
greater detail. The additional cases were those scheduled to be heard by the division during Oct.
1973, Apr. 1974, and Sept. 1974. This added 79 cases for Suffolk County and 14 cases for
Middlesex County. Since these cases were all applicants, the 210 nonapplicant cases of Suffolk
County were weighted by (79 + 89)/89, and the 115 nonapplicant cases in Middlesex County by
(14 + 32)/32. The final sample, on which all calculations are based, therefore consists of 564
Suffolk County units and 211 Middlesex County units, for a total of 775 units.
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weighted sample of 443 cases. 4 4 In Connecticut, eligibility for appeal
requires that the sentence be a potential maximum of at least 1 year; in
Massachusetts, 2 years. Since this study generally compares the two
states, we have eliminated in many tables the 67 offenders from the
1972 Connecticut Superior Court sample (7 percent of the total) who
had sentences below the 2 years so as to make the offender populations for the two states comparable. 45 This leaves the primary Connecticut sample at 851 (918 - 67) units.
V.

MAIN PATTERNS OF APPEAL AND DISPOSITION

The comprehensive picture as it emerges from our sample for the
Connecticut courts is presented in table 2.
TABLE 2
Sentence Review Pattern in Connecticut Superior
Courts, 1972
Percent of
Eligible Cases

Percent of
Appeals Heard

(N 918)

(N= 155)

=

No appeal .........
Appeal withdrawn ...

Appeal ...........
Affirmed ..........
Increased ........
Reduced ........
Total .........

76.3
6.8

16.9
93

15.7
1.2
100.0

7
100

Seventy-six percent of all offenders eligible for appeal never filed
one; of the remaining 24 percent who did ask for a review, 7 percent
later withdrew their requests. Thus, the division reviewed 17 percent of
44. (a) The 75 nonapplicants from each of the three superior court counties were weighted
by the actual number of 1972 nonapplicants from that county. Thus, there were 137 nonapplicants from Fairfield County in 1972 and the 75 sampled nonapplicants were weighted by
137/75; similarly the 75 sampled nonapplicants from Hartford County were weighted by 220/75
and the 75 sampled nonapplicants from New Haven County by 114/75. These weighting procedures resulted in 137 + 220 + 114 = 471 nonapplicant units.
(b) There were 218 applicants in 1972 from all superior courts. There were 471 nonapplicants from the three sampled counties and 229 from other superior courts. The 471 units from
the sampled counties were therefore weighted by 700/471 to estimate the 1972 nonapplicant
cases in all superior courts.
(c) When the 700 nonapplicant units are added to the 218 applicants, the sample contains
918 units representing all superior court cases eligible for sentence review in 1972.
45. In none of the eliminated cases was the sentence reduced: 58 were not appealed; in 3
cases an appeal was made and withdrawn; the six maintained appeals were all unsuccessful.
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the eligible sentences, or roughly one out of every six. Of the reviewed
sentences, 7 percent were reduced, amounting to 1.2 percent of all
imposed sentences eligible for review. There has been no sentence
increase in Connecticut since 1963.
The disposition pattern did not change significantly over time, as
the following table for Connecticut shows.
TABLE 3
Disposition of Filed Appeals (Percent)
1962
Withdrawn .............
Dismissed ............
Sentence reduced .....
Total ..............

=

37)
41
54
5
100

(N

1967
=

(N

132)

(N

34
61
5
100

1972
=

327)a

32
62
6
100

aThe sum of these cases is 496. The difference between 496 and 851
(see table 2) is due to the omission of the cases in which no appeal was
filed. We obtained a nonapplicant sample only for 1972 from the superior
courts of the three major counties.

In Massachusetts the comparable statistics as provided by our sample have to be adjusted. Among the 506 cases in our sample there was
not one sentence increase, but we know from the statistics compiled
each year by the Executive Secretary of the Massachusetts Superior
Court 4 6 that the division does occasionally increase sentences. Over a
five-year period the division reviewed 935 sentences, increased 14 (1.5
percent), and reduced 144 (15.4 percent). The ratio of reductions to
increases, therefore, is about ten to one. On this basis one would have
expected one or two increases in our sample of 506 cases. That we
found none is well within the vagaries of the sampling error. In the
following table (table 4) we have added sentence increases as expected
(and not as we found them) so as to give the best estimate of the real
situation. The share of dismissals is correspondingly reduced. Of all eligible offenders 27 percent filed an appeal, but roughly one-half of these
appeals were withdrawn, so that 13 percent of all eligible offenders asked
for and obtained a review hearing. In 21 percent of these hearings the
sentence was modified; 19 percent were reductions, and 2 percent were
increases. Thus, on the average, of all eligible sentences, 23 out of every
1,000 are reduced, and 2 out of every 1,000 are increased.
46. Fourteenth through Eighteenth Annual Reports to the Justices of the Supreme Judicial
Court by the Executive Secretary (Public Document No. 166) June 30, 1970, 1971, 1972,
1973, and 1974.
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TABLE 4
Sentencing Review Pattern in Massachusettsa
Percent of
Eligible Cases
(N = 775)
No appeal .........
Appeal withdrawn ...
Appeal ...........
Affirmed ........
Increased ..........
Reduced ..........
Total .........

Percent of
Appeals
Completed
(N = 103)

72.5
14.3
13.2
79
2
19

10.7
.2
2.3
100.0

100

aThe full year 1973, plus additional appealed cases from
1972 and 1974 (see note 43 supra).

This is the overall picture in the two states. Frequency of sentence
modification and presumably therefore frequency of appeal appear to
be related to at least three characteristics of the case: the severity of
the original sentence; whether sentence was imposed after trial or after
guilty plea; and in some instances the identity of the sentencing judge.
These relationships are discussed in the following sections.
VI.

SEVERITY OF THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE

We know already 4 7

that roughly three-fourths

of all eligible

offenders never file an appeal, that some of the remaining one-fourth
later withdraw their appeal, with the result that in Massachusetts only
13 percent and in Connecticut only 17 percent of all eligible cases are
heard by the division.
Table 5 shows how these various decision points are related to the
severity of the original sentence.
In Massachusetts the average sentence for all eligible defendants
was 84 months. The cases eventually heard by the division had an
average sentence of 142 months, 69 percent above the 84-month average. The average sentence of those who never filed an appeal was 74
months, 12 percent below the average for all offenders.
The situation in Connecticut is similar; the average sentence of all
defendants heard by the division is 71 percent above the average. The
similarity is the more impressive since the level of prison sentences in
the two states differs enormously: the average sentence minimum in

47. From tables 2 and 4.
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TABLE 5
Average Length of Appealed and Modified Sentences
Massachusetts

No appeal ..........
Appeal withdrawn ....

Appeal ............
Affirmed .........
Reduced .........
All cases ........

Percent

Average
Sentence
Minimum
(Months)

73
14
13

74
84
142

Percent
Below or Above
Average of
84 Months
-12
0
+69
+70
+58

84 months

Connecticut

No appeal ..........
Appeal withdrawn

....

Appeal ............
Affirmed .........
Reduced .........

Percent
76
7
17
15.7
1.3

All cases ........

Percent
Below or Above
Average of
31 Months

Average
Sentence
Minimum
(Months)

-16
+26
+71

26
39
53

+65
+139
31 months

100

Massachusetts is 84 months (7 years) as against 31 months (2 years, 7
months) in Connecticut, a ratio of 2.6 to 1.
Table 6 for Massachusetts and table 7 for Connecticut allow a
more precise view of the relationship between the severity of the original sentence and the various decisions in the review process.
TABLE 6
Massachusetts Rate of Reduction and Appeal by Minimum of Original Sentence
Percent of Cases
Percent of
Eligible Cases
(N = 775)

Minimum
Sentence
(Months)

1
24
7
25
43

Up to 24b ......
25-36b ...........
37-48 .........
49-60 .........
61 or more ......
Total .......
Average ........................

Appealeda

(x)
0
[0.5
4
4
27

Reduceda
(y)

Success Rate
of Appeals
(y) - (x)

0
0.5
0
0
5

0
100]
0
0
19

100
13

2.3

18

aof all cases in that sentence group.
bAll defendants used for data in this table received a sentence maximum of at least
30 months; the minimum can be smaller.
*One case, see text infra at note 48.
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The first column in table 6 gives the distribution of the minimum
sentence received by all Massachusetts offenders eligible for review.
One-fourth of them (1% + 24%) received sentences up to 3 years, about
one-third (7% + 25%) sentences over 3 and up to 5 years, and the
remaining 43 percent received minimum sentences of over 5 years.
Column (y) reveals for each sentence bracket the proportion of eligible
sentences-irrespective of whether they had been appealed-that were
reduced by the division. The picture that column (y) reveals for Massachusetts is startling. Except for one single, somewhat out-of-theordinary case, 4 8 the Massachusetts division had modified only those
sentences where the minimum was over 5 years. The pattern is so clear
that it amounts to tacit rulemaking, albeit a rule that, if made explicit,
might be regarded as violating the statute that makes all sentences with
a possible maximum of 2 years or more eligible for review. In any
event, as column (x) shows, this unstated rule appears to be well
understood by the potential applicants. No applicants (again with the
one exception) applied for review who had received a prison sentence
with a minimum of 3 years or less. And of the offenders who received
minimum sentences of over 3 and up to 5 years, only 4 percent applied
for review. In the over-5-year group, 27 percent of the offenders
appealed, and 19 percent of the appeals were successful; thus 5 percent
of all offenders with sentences over 5 years received reductions.
The picture for Connecticut is in many respects similar.
TABLE 7
Connecticut Rate of Reduction and Appeal by Minimum of Original Sentence
Minimum
Sentence
(Months)

Percent of
Eligible Cases
(N = 918)

Up to 24 .......
25-36 .........
37-48 .........
49-60 .........
61 or more ......

53
13
5
7
22

Total .......

Percent of Cases
Appealeda
Reduceda
(x)
(y)

Success Rate
of Appeals
(y) (x

6
26
31
37
26

*

3

0
8
2
3

0
26
5
12

16.9

1.2

100

Average .............................

7

aof cases whether appealed or not.
*Less than half of 1 percent; actually, one case.

48. The exception, in the 25-36-month group, was the one sentence appealed out of the 186
cases, and it resulted in a sentence reduction. The offender was a woman with four children
who had been pregnant at the time of the offense. See case 528 in section XI.
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Connecticut, too, has its minimum level below which a sentence is
not considered for reduction: practically no sentence under 3 years is
ever modified. This limit is lower than in Massachusetts but because of
the generally lower sentences in Connecticut, it excludes 66 percent of
all eligible sentences from consideration, a larger proportion than in
Massachusetts.
The gross appeal rate in Connecticut at the sentence levels where
reductions occur is of the same magnitude as at the over-5-year level in
Massachusetts, generally around 30 percent. Unlike Massachusetts, however, Connecticut also has a substantial appeal rate at the 25-36-month
level, and 6 percent of the offenders appeal even at the lowest sentence
level although the chances of reduction are practically nil.
VII.

SENTENCE IMPOSED AFTER TRIAL AND AFTER GUILTY PLEA

Often a defendant pleads guilty after some bargain with the prosecutor that may include an agreed-upon sentence recommendation. The
judge, of course, is not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation. But
if the judge accedes to it, as is often the case, one might say that the
defendant had accepted the sentence and therefore is bound by it. This
is the view of the Connecticut division. Efforts to have a sentence
reduced because it was in fact "no bargain" fail:
The agreement was fairly secured, the plea was voluntary and knowing, and
the prosecution kept its bargain with the accused.
bargained for the sentence he received. He cannot now comThe defendant
5
plain. 0
These sentences [were] a result of plea bargaining and were agreed to by the
defendant and his counsel. A request for a lesser sentence is not in order.

The division goes further and will hesitate to modify a sentence
which, though not agreed upon, was implied by the plea concluded
after negotiation.
The defendant received consideration when he was permitted to plead guilty
to robbery in the third degree as he was previously presented on robbery in
the first degree.., which offense carries a mandatory five year minimum sentence.

It appears that the Connecticut division accepts only sentences for
review which were neither explicitly nor implicitly part of the plea
49. Published opinion: State v. Cato, 29 Conn. Supp. 443, 290 A.2d 901 (1972).
50. Unpublished opinion. This quotation and many of those that follow are from opinions
not published by the review division; they were taken from division files. Because the opinions
are not a matter of public record and contain information on criminal history, they are not
cited by name. Whenever a quotation is presented without a citation, it comes from an unpublished opinion.
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bargain. This may happen if the judge does not accept the agreed-upon
recommendation, or if a sentence recommendation was not part of the
bargain. Mere disregard of the prosecutor's recommendation, however, is
no automatic ground for sentence reduction.
A sentencing judge is not required to rubber-stamp a recommendation even if
it is an agreed recommendation. He has the discretion to sentence the accused

as he sees fit.

For all these reasons there should be fewer sentence reductions and
fewer appeals after a plea of guilty than after trial. Furthermore, cases
that go to trial involve on the average more serious crimes and therefore
fetch more severe sentences. Finally, there is some reason to believe
that, even for the same offense, sentences after trial are at times higher
than those given after a guilty plea. For all these reasons we should
expect a lower rate of sentence reduction and a lower appeal ratio
among offenders convicted after a guilty plea. These facts are borne out
in table 8.
TABLE 8

Rate of Sentence Appeal and Reduction by Type of Conviction
Massachusetts (Sentences over 5 Years Only)a
Percent
After
Guilty Plea
No appeal .........
Appeal ...........
Affirmed ...........
14.0
Reduced ........... 4.6

After Trial

81.0
19.0

61.8
38.2
32.7
5.1

Total ..........

100.0

100.0

Number .............

(195)

(136)

Connecticut (Sentences over 3 Years Only)a
Percent
After
Guilty Plea
No appeal .........
Appeal ...........
Affirmed ...........
Reduced ...........

After Trial

75.2
24.8
22.3
2.5

48.0
52.0
44.0
8.0

Total ...........

100.0

100.0

Number .............

(318)

(25)

aSee text at tables 6 and 7 supra.
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In both Massachusetts and Connecticut the rate of sentence appeal
after trial is twice as high as after a guilty plea; and in each category
the Connecticut rate is higher than the corresponding Massachusetts
rate. Normally, appeal rates reflect the likelihood of success. One would
expect, therefore, higher reduction rates for sentences after trial. For
Massachusetts this is not true: both rates are in the neighborhood of 5
percent. In Connecticut, the success rate after trial is 8 percent, as
against 2.5 percent after guilty plea. But the sample of trials there is so
small (25 cases) that one cannot be sure it is a true result.
There are fewer trials in Connecticut than in Massachusetts, as the
following official statistics show.5 1
TABLE 9
Disposition of Felony Indictments in Massachusetts and Connecticut (Percent)
Trialsa

Massachusetts
(N= 17,191) ...
Connecticut
(N = 3,004) ....

Acquittals
(4)

Total
Convictions
(2) + (3)

Dismissals
(1)

Guilty
Pleas
(2)

Convictions
(3)

20.0

59.6

12.1

8.3

20.4

71.7

21.5

74.7

2.5

1.3

3.8

77.2

Total
(3) + (4)

aln Massachusetts 47 percent of the trials were jury; 53 percent, bench. In
Connecticut, the corresponding figures were 82 percent, jury; 18 percent, bench.

In Massachusetts 20 percent of all felony indictments reach trial; in
Connecticut, only 4 percent do. These figures differ from those in table
8 because they include indictments that were dismissed or resulted in
acquittal and sentences not eligible for appeal because they fell below
the eligibility limit.
Tables 10 and 11 allow a more refined insight into the different
reaction of the system toward sentences after trial and after guilty plea
by presenting the alternative separately for the various degrees of
severity of the original sentence. Table 10 concerns Massachusetts. In
that state, of course, we have no policy expressions and are left to infer
the policy from the decision pattern. As we already know, the division
normally does not modify any sentence that begins with 5 years or less,
51. Figures obtained from official statistics of Connecticut and Massachusetts. A low ratio
of trials is a tradition of long standing in the state of Connecticut. A 1955 count revealed 3
jury trials per year per 100,000 populatign for Connecticut as against 51 in Massachusetts (cf.
Harry Kalven, Jr., & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 502 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1971).
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hence column (x) has nothing but zeros except for the line that represents sentences over 5 years and the one exceptional case after trial. In
that group of high sentences, however, the reduction rate is the same-5
percent-after trial and after guilty plea, even though the appeal rate is
twice as high after trial (38%) as after guilty plea (19%).
TABLE 10
Rates of Reduction and Appeal by Severity of Sentence and Type of
Conviction in Massachusetts
Percent of
Eligible Cases

Minimum
Sentence
(Months)

Percent of Cases
Appealed
(x)

Reduced
(y)

Success Rate
of Appeals
(y) - (x)

After guilty plea

(N = 528):
Up to 24 ......

25-36 ........
37-48 ........
49-60 ........
61 and over ....
Total

........

2

0

0

0

30
7
25

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

36

19

5

24

7

1.7

27

100

Average ............................
After trial
(N = 226):
Up to 24 ......

0

0

0

0

25-36 ........
37-48 ........
49-60 ........

11
7
22

[4
7
12

4
0
0

100]
0
0

61 and over ....

60

38

5

13

26

3.5

13

Total

100

Average ...........................
*One case; see table 6.

Table 11 presents the Connecticut figures. The surprising aspect of
the Connecticut pattern is the division's hesitancy to modify sentences
after trial unless the sentences had a minimum of more than 5 years.
Trial, as we saw, is in Connecticut the exceptional way of disposing of
an indictment, and perhaps there is a feeling in the division that if a
defendant-against tradition-insisted on a trial, he must accept the consequences. Such thoughts may be inferred from the following scenario
of a case:
Defendant, just before trial, had been offered a nine-month jail term recom-
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mendation by the state's attorney. His codefendant was offered the same deal,
took it, and was sentenced accordingly. The defendant went to trial and was
convicted of robbery with violence ($.35 taken). The state's attorney recommended 5 to 15 years in prison. The judge sentenced him to a 3- to 8-year
prison term. The division affirmed.

The appeal rate for convictions after trial is nevertheless considerable at all sentence levels, suggesting that perhaps in a larger sample of
trial convictions (the present one contains only 42 cases) we would also
find reductions at the lower levels.
TABLE 11

Rates of Reduction and Appeal by Severity of Sentence and Type of
Conviction in Connecticut
Minimum
Sentence
(Months)

Percent of
Eligible Cases

After guilty plea
(N = 809):
Up to 24 ......
25-36 ........
37-48 ........
49-60 ........
61 and over ....

51
14
5
6
23

Total .......

Percent of Cases

Success Rate
of Appeals
(y - x)

Appealed
(x)

Reduced

6
9
33
37
23

*

4

0
7
1
2

0
23
5
7

16

1.0

(

100

Average ............................
After trial
(N = 42):
Up to 24 ......
25-36 ........
37-48 ........
49-60 ........
61 and over ....

21
19
5
12
43

Total .......

33
62
0
40
61

0
0
0
0
11

6

0
0
0
0
18

100

Average ............................

50

4.8

10

*One case; see table 7.

VIII. IDENTITY OF THE SENTENCING JUDGE

Our data carry the suggestion that the sentences of some judges
have a greater probability of being reduced than those of other judges.
Table 12 records the reduction and appeal rates for the 23 Massachusetts judges in our sample with ten or more cases.
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Only 7 of the 23 judges who had at least ten cases had any of
their sentences reduced, but the proportion of reductions varies considerably from judge to judge: 14 percent for Judge No. 12, 7 percent
for Judge No. 3, etc.; the other 5 judges have lower rates, and 16 judges
had none of their sentences modified. The fact that these rates are
distributed unequally does not by itself suggest that some judges are
more likely to encounter reductions than others; pure chance will
always yield variations. At issue is the magnitude of the variations.
There is a standard statistical procedure designed to test whether a
distribution such as this significantly differs from what pure chance
would have produced. That test suggests that the instant distribution is
on the borderline beyond which one would firmly assert that some of
5
these judges have a higher likelihood of being reversed . 1
TABLE 12

Sentence Reduction and Appeal Rate of Massachusetts Judges with 10 or More Cases
Judge
No.
1a .........
2 .....
.......
3a ..........
4a . .........
5 ............
6 ..........
7 a ..........
8a .........
9 ..........
10 ...........
11 ..........
12a .........

Percent of All Cases
Reduction
Appeal
Rate
Rate
1
0
7
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
14

6
14
35
15
5
0
6
43
7
0
14
20

Judge
No.

Percent of All Cases
Reduction
Appeal
Rate
Rate

13 .. .........
14a ........
15 ..........
16a ........
17 & 18b ....
19a ........
20 ...........
21 a ........
22a ........
23 a
All other judges
combined ...

0
5
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
5

13
16
6
0
13
3
16
11
4
5

9

1

aAt least 20 cases.
bTwo judges had to be coded together; they had a combined total of 52 cases.

We have, however, additional evidence that encourages us to firmly
assert that proposition. If we look at the rates of appeal for these
various judges, we find that with the exception of Judge No. 8, who
had no sentence reduced but had 43 percent appealed, the two judgesNos. 12 and 3-who have the highest reduction rate have also the
highest appeal rate. This suggests that these judges are known for their
heavier sentences and for that reason are more often appealed.
52. Cf. Quinn McNemar, Psychological Statistics (4th ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1969). For modification rates, x2 = 30.81, p < .10; for appeal rates, x2 = 89.10, p < .001.
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SIZE OF SENTENCE REDUCTIONS

Both Connecticut and Massachusetts give indeterminate sentences
by setting both the minimum and the maximum. As a rule, both limits
are reduced but occasionally only the minimum or the maximum sentence is modified. On the average, the size of the reduction in both
states is about one-third of the original sentence, for both the sentence
maximum and the minimum. Tables 13 and 14 give the detailed picture.

TABLE 13

Size of Sentence Reductions in Connecticuta
Minimum
Case No.
176
175
182
184
186
187
210
211
317
181
539
535
284
285
149
177
178
213

....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....

From

Percent
Reduction

4

25

6
10
5
10
9
9
2.5
4
2
4
10
8
5
6.5
3.5

0
0
20
50
22
11
40
50
50
25
20
37
60
42
29

Average reduction .........

From
8
5
25
65
10
20
10
18
5
7
5
10
14
15
10
9
7
3

Maximum
Percent
To
Reduction
6
3
10
37
10
10
10
16
3
6
2
6
12
15
5
7
5
2

25
40
60
43
0
50
0
11
40
16
60
40
16
0
50
22
29
33

30 ................... 30

aSeven cases omitted because the sentence was suspended or
reduced to time already served.
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TABLE 14
Size of Sentence Reductions in Massachusettsa
Minimum

Maximum

Case.No.

From

Percent
Reduction

5 ....
16 ....
302 ....
307 ....
314 ....
354 ....
390 ....
392 ....
394 ....
423 ....
435 ....
491 ....
521 ....
484b ..
465b ...

10
10
7.5
8
9
25
12
5
4
18
10
7
9
5
10

30
30
33
38
73
60
25
50
50
17
60
47
0
20
9

Average reduction .........

From

To

Percent
Reduction

20
20
13
10
10
35
20
7
7
20
20
12
15
10
20

20
20
10
7
2.5
20
20
2.5
2
20
10
12
10
5
10

0
0
23
30
75
47
0
65
69
0
50
0
33
50
50

36 .................

33

aFive sentence reductions are omitted from this table: one
sentence of 3-10 years was suspended; in a second instance, two
codefendants who had received 2 consecutive life sentences had one of
the sentences changed to 8-10 years; in the remaining reductions one
codefendant who had received consecutive life and 7-10-year sentences
had the sentences made concurrent and the other codefendant had
consecutive 4-5- and 7-10-year sentences made concurrent.
bconcurrent sentences.

We now have reached a crucial stage in our investigation, namely
the search for the reasons the review board modified or did not modify
the sentences in these cases. The next three sections present our findings.
X.

REASONS FOR REDUCTIONS: CONNECTICUT

Our search for reasons in the cases in which the Connecticut Sentence Review Division (SRD) reviewed the sentence was aided to some
extent by the reasons stated in the opinions. We present herein thumbnail sketches of these opinions grouped in five categories. In table 15
we offer a summary of the reasons given by the division in these 24
cases (see p. 917 infra).s
53. These cases include all sentence modifications in Connecticut for 1962, 1967, and 1972.
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(1) Sentence Exceeded Statutory Limit
Case 175
A 17-year-old boy had pleaded guilty to being a youthful offender. He
had sold drugs-heroin and marijuana-to fellow students who subsequently
became ill in school. There had been a public uproar and the judge sentenced
the defendant to an indefinite term in the reformatory.
The SRD said that in principle the sentence was not too severe, but it
noted that the law allows a court to commit a youthful offender only "for a
period not to exceed three years." The sentence was accordingly modified.
Case 153
The defendant, a 19-year-old boy without any record, pleaded guilty to a
charge of breach of the peace, which had resulted from an altercation with
the police. The D.A. had recommended a 3-month suspended sentence, but
the judge imposed an indefinite sentence (maximum 2 years) at the reformatory.
The division noted that the offense was a class-B misdemeanor, which
allows a maximum sentence of 6 months. Inasmuch as the defendant by the
time he came before the SRD had served over 51/ months, the division
changed the sentence to "time served."
(2) Sentence Out of Line witb Codefendants'
Case 211
Defendant and two codefendants, one of them his brother, had held up a
bank at gun point. The defendant fired two shots, said, "We're not fooling
around," and the codefendant meanwhile collected the money. The loot was
recovered after a chase. All pleaded guilty to robbery, 1st degree. The state's
attorney had recommended 8-16 years for each defendant. One codefendant
received that sentence; the other codefendant, who had given information to
the state, received a sentence of 6-12 years; the defendant a sentence of 9-18
years, after the state's attorney changed his recommendation to this term.
At the SRD hearing, the defendant argued that he and his brother should
be treated equally (8-16 years). The state's attorney agreed and the SRD so
ordered.
s4
Case 112
Some codefendants do not provide automatic standards for comparison.
The board will at times distinguish with great care. The defendant, 18 years
old, with two codefendants had stolen some tires and wheels from a car
dealer. The tires were recovered from a codefendant. All three defendants
pleaded guilty to theft; the defendant was sentenced to the state reformatory for an indefinite term while his two codefendants were given suspended
sentences of 6 months in jail. It seems the distinction was made because the
defendant had a record of a suspended jail sentence in 1965 for injury to
personal property and breaking and entering a dwelling in the daytime, and
was on probation when the present offense was committed.
54. State v. Cole, 27 Conn. Supp. 398, 240 A.2d 98 (1968).
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The SRD, however, noted several circumstances that, in its opinion,
should here counterbalance the record: "Although it is not within the province of this Division to protect the collateral constitutional rights of a defendant, the complete lack of any statement on behalf sf-this-defendant [who
appeared without counsel] when the other two co-defendants, who received
less harsh sentences were represented by counsel, make it difficult for this
Division to adequately review the action of the sentencing court.
"We particularly note that the theft was for the benefit of a co-defendant
who received a less harsh sentence. We also note that the defendant showed
remorse when given an opportunity to speak, saying, 'I'm sorry [for] what
happened. I went down and turned myself in. That's about it.' The defendant
must be given the benefit of all these mitigating circumstances."
The division ordered that the trial court sentence be suspended as the
defendant at the time of the hearing had spent almost five months in prison.
Case 176
The 21-year-old defendant pleaded guilty to robbery with violence and to
theft with two friends after having stolen a car and held up a gasoline station.
The case against the two friends was nolled because both were doing a lengthy
prison term at the time for another offense. The defendant was sentenced to
4-8 years.
The SRD reduced the sentence to 3-6 years: "This was the defendant's
first felony offense. In addition Charles Marsh and Ronald Marsh did not
receive any punishment for their participation in the holdup. Therefore the
division believes that the four to eight sentence is a little high."
Case 539
The 19-year-old defendant had pleaded guilty to a count of issuing a bad
check and to burglary three. He had stolen and forged an $89 check and with
two other young men burglarized a moving company, from which they stoleand later cashed-two checks worth $140. One of the codefendants, who had
no prior record, received a suspended sentence. The defendant, who had been
incarcerated previously for less than a year, had been on parole at the time of
his arrest, and had altogether 9 adult convictions, received a 2-5-year sentence.
The second codefendant, however, who, as 1he SRD notes, "had a prior
record similar to that of the applicant," received a 1-year jail sentence.
The division found, therefore, the 2-5-year sentence "so disproportionate
to the similarly situated codefendant as to be unduly harsh" and reduced the
sentence to 1-2 years.
Case 86355
The defendant was a 20-year-old boy, a high school dropout and unskilled
worker who nevertheless had a somewhat stable work record. He had taken
part in youth group vandalism-burglary at two unguarded homes.
The division's review weighed his degree of participation against that of
his codefendants who had received sentences ranging from suspension to incarceration. The division noted that the defendant participated only twice in

55. State v. Chvirko, 23 Conn. Supp. 355, 183 A.2d 629 (1962).
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these burglaries, which had extended over a period of three months. Only
once did he enter the house. On his record was only a breach of the peace
violation; he had a good school record and was a church member. In consideration of the sentences his codefendants received, his sentence of 1 -3 years
was modified to 6 months in jail, with an additional probation for 24 months.
Case 499
The defendant, together with another young woman, pleaded guilty to the
charge of obtaining money under false pretenses and of subsequent breach of
the peace. Both women had similar prior records-several adult convictionsand both received the same sentence of 1-3 years. The codefendant's lawyers
moved later that the sentence be reduced, and a judge in the trial court
(apparently not the trial judge) suspended the rest of the sentence and put the
codefendant on parole. When the defendant made a similar motion to that
judge, he realized that he had had no right to reduce a sentence and refused
this time.
The SRD thought it its duty to equalize the two sentences and ordered
that the defendant's sentence also be suspended with parole. It adds, somewhat superfluously: "Since the Division cannot conceive that this situation
will ever come up again... it will not consider its decision in this case as
precedent."
Case 213
The defendant, age 17, was in high school at the time of the offense. He
pleaded guilty to 11 counts of burglary and claimed that he committed the
offenses to get money so his friend could pay for his car. The defendant was
sentenced to an indefinite to 3-year reformatory sentence, while his codefendants received probation and suspended sentences.
The division reduced his sentence to a 2-year maximum but did not
suspend it, pointing out that the defendant lacked the stable family environment of his codefendants.
(3) Adult Would Have Received Less
Case 12056
Defendant was an 18-year-old boy, raised by a relative, a high school
dropout with a very unstable work history and 2 prior adult convictions for
property crimes. In the instant case, defendant pleaded guilty to 1 count of
larceny for looting several 7-Up machines of not more than $15 from any one
machine. He was sentenced to a maximum of 2 years in the reformatory.
Upon review, defendant's sentence was suspended to the 5 months he had
already served. His codefendant's sentence had been likewise suspended on
review. The division considered the minor nature of the charge and the fact
that an adult if convicted of that charge could have received (by statute) no
more than a 4-month sentence.

56. State v. Lytwyn, 27 Conn. Supp. 78, 230 A.2d 40 (1967).
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(4) Events that Superseded Trial
Case 187
The defendant, a drug addict, had, at age 22, a record of 21 adult convictions: 9 or more burglary convictions, 7 felony convictions, and 5 arrests without convictions. He had previously been incarcerated. He pleaded guilty to 10
counts of burglary and to being a habitual offender, which allows the sentence
to be doubled.
In this unusual case, the division had before it a letter from the sentencing judge asking that the sentence be changed: "In thinking about the
sentence afterwards, I have come to believe that it was too severe and that a
concurrent sentence in Docket No. 18752, for an effective term of 5 to 10
years, would be fairer under all the circumstances." The SRD accepted the
recommendation. The defendant had originally been sentenced to 10-20 years;
the division, upon the trial judge's recommendation, cut the sentence in half.
Case 753 57
The defendant in this case was a 17-year-old sentenced to an indefinite
sentence in the reformatory, serving a maximum possible time of 2 years for
willful injury to private property. He was accused by his landlord of causing
$125 damage to furniture in the apartment he rented. He had already paid
$70 in restitution payments. The defendant had a record of 5 adult convictions, including prior incarceration. He pleaded guilty to the present offense.
Upon review, the division reduced the sentence to 3 months and
suspended it, noting that the sentencing judge had not been informed about
the nature and extent of the damage: "The events constituting the offense
available before the Division prove to be more in the nature of hard usage and
unsanitary housekeeping, the most serious damage being a cut in the upholstery of a divan. If these facts had been brought to the attention of the court,
it seems reasonably probable that it would not have considered the sentence it
imposed, as such a penalty is disproportionate to the injury sustained."
(5) Sentence Too Severe
Case 14958
The defendant, age 23, with no prior record of any kind, had gone on a
spree of motel hold-ups with a toy pistol. Nobody was ever hurt. He pleaded
guilty to several counts of robbery and was sentenced to 5-10 years. As a
child he had been in a concentration camp; he had an excellent scholastic
record and stable employment as a skilled engineer.
The division noted that he had "a history of hardship, valor, and brilliant
achievement," except for the crime spree. "His prior record is the only basis
for the decision of the board that his sentence should be modified." It was:
2-5 years.
57. State v. Wallick, 27 Conn. Supp. 387, 239 A.2d 544 (1968).
58. State v. Malolepszy, 24 Conn. Supp. 304, 190 A.2d 231 (1963).
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Case 181
While on escape from jail, defendant stole a car and, wnen captured,
pleaded guilty to one count each of escape and theft of a motor vehicle. He
was sentenced for these offenses to 4-7 years (concurrent with previous sentence of 1-2 years) out of a possible maximum of 20. Defendant is 21 years
old, single, a semi-skilled worker with a somewhat unstable work record. At
the time of the offense, defendant was on drugs. His prior record included 9
adult convictions for property crimes, 2 for car theft, and 7 arrests without
convictions.
Upon review, the division reduced the sentence to 1-3 years, to run consecutive to the previous sentence, thus producing a sentence, in effect, of 2-6
years. By way of explanation, the division noted that the sentences for theft
and escape "were higher than they should be."
Case 182
Defendant was convicted by a jury of four counts of possession and sale
of heroin. He was given a sentence of 6-25 years. He was 22 years old, a high
school dropout, and an unskilled worker with an unstable work history. His
prior record consisted of 2 juvenile and 6 adult convictions, 4 of which were
felony convictions, some of them for the same offense as in the instant case.
None of the earlier convictions resulted in incarceration.
When the sentence was reviewed by the SRD, the minimum was not
reduced, but the maximum sentence was reduced to 10 years because the
division found the sentence "too severe when compared to others convicted of
the same offense and with similar histories."
Case 184
Defendant had pleaded guilty to three counts of rape of old women, a
count of armed robbery, and a count of burglary with violence. Together, the
consecutive sentences amounted to a sentence of 10-65 years. The division is
concerned with the extraordinarily high maximum sentence. It notes that all
these crimes had been committed during a 9-month period during which the
defendant suffered from a serious mental problem and disturbances.
Citing the ABA Standards for Sentencing (that 25 years should be the
outside limit for accomplishing rehabilitation), the SRD compromised and
reduced the sentence to 10-37 years. In its view, a 65-year maximum was
"too long and severe to accomplish the purpose and objectives of sentencing."
But the division thought that the time had not yet come to throw the prison
key away for this defendant.
Case 317
A furniture store was broken into. Defendant pleaded guilty to one count
each of burglary three and 2 counts of larceny and was sentenced to 2 -5
years in the reformatory. He is a 19-year-old high school dropout and
unskilled worker. He had one prior adult misdemeanor conviction and four
prior arrests without convictions, but no prior incarcerations.
Upon review the SRD reduced his sentence to 1 -3 years, noting the
defendant's minor record, and concluded: "While it appears that the defendant does need some strict supervision, it is the belief of the division that the
term given was too long, considering all the circumstances."
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Case 284
The defendant was a 24-year-old man, who had been living with a woman
for several weeks, when she moved out of the apartment, leaving him a note
saying that she was leaving for good. After drinking almost two quarts of gin,
he went to her home and killed her with two shots from his pistol. He had no
prior record, pleaded guilty to manslaughter, and was sentenced to 10-14
years.
The SRD noted: "The presentence report describes the defendant as a
hard working, congenial, nonaggressive person without any prior tendency
toward violence and without any arrests or prior record. The state's attorney
recommended a higher minimum than that imposed by the court. The defendant has been truly penitent for the wrong he had wrought. At the time of
his sentencing, he stated: 'I never meant to hurt anybody. I don't know what
happened, what I was thinking but I'm sorry. Please have some mercy on me,
that's all.' Pending his arraignment and while the accused was at the state jail,
he aided the authorities by helping to quell a riot and saved some guards from
bodily harm." Then follows this statement: "The SRD feels the sentence
somewhat severe." The sentence was reduced to 8-12 years.
Case 285
The defendant's wife, mother of his three children, from whom he was
separated at the time of the crime, was beaten by a pimp who had a long
criminal record and was coerced into prostitution. Defendant insisted that his
wife report the incident to the police, which she did. Whereupon the pimp
threatened the woman, demanding that the charges be dropped. Defendant
took a gun and killed the man. He was indicted for murder and pleaded guilty
to manslaughter; he was sentenced to 8-15 years.
The division noted that the offense was committed "during a period of
smoldering agony and seething turmoil over the treatment his wife had
received at the hands of the decedent ....
Under all the circumstances of this
case, the division concludes that sentencing goals would be achieved by less
severe sentencing" and reduced the minimum sentence from 8 to 5 years.
Case 210
A 9-10-year sentence for several counts of selling heroin was reduced to
7-10 years. The reasons: "The sentence was within the legal limits. However,
it is slightly high when compared with sentences recently sustained by this
division on similar matters arising in the Willimantic and Waterbury areas. The
Division has the obligation to bring sentences into line so that the defendants
concerned will feel that they have been treated fairly."
9
Case 1685
The defendant is a 16-year-old boy living with both parents and still in
high school, who, while drinking and driving recklessly, struck a car and killed
one passenger. He had no record of any kind, pleaded no contest, and was
sentenced to the reformatory for 9 months, to be suspended after 6 months
had been served.

59. State v. Daley, 27 Conn. Supp. 232, 234 A.2d 451 (1967).
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Upon review, his sentence was terminated at 4 months. The division
decided that since the defendant had a favorable background and seemed

unlikely to commit any further offenses, a reformatory sentence was unnecessary.
Case 535
The 32-year-old defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual contacts
in the third degree and to one count of risk of injury. The acts were committed on his stepdaughters, aged 15 and 17. The sentence was 4-10 years.
Upon review, his sentence was reduced to 3-6 years. The division took
into account the fact that the defendant had lost his job and family while the
case was being prosecuted and the fact that his wife and daughters had tried
to withdraw the complaint against him. The division, gratuitously, it seems,
noted: "For these acts the defendant deserves to be punished. The problem
obviously is to tailor the punishment both to the crime and the individual
involved."
Case 186
The defendant, age 26, married, with two dependents, pleaded guilty to 3
counts of burglary two and 4 counts of burglary three. He was arrested in the
house he was burglarizing and later confessed to an additional 22 burglaries.
He had never been incarcerated but had a record of 4 felony convictions. His
original sentence was 5-10 years.
In reducing the minimum to 4 years, the division said that the sentence
was a "little high under the circumstances."
Case 177
The defendant, age 20, pleaded guilty to 5 counts of burglary three and 2
counts of larceny two. He had 2 felony convictions and previous periods of
incarceration for between 1 and 5 years. His record indicated a drug problem.
The defendant was sentenced to 6 -9 years in prison.
Upon review, the division reduced the sentence to 3 -7 years but gave no
specific reason for the reduction.
Table 15 gives the reason statistics as summarized from the case-

by-case analysis.
The reasons in categories (1) through (4) differ in kind from the
reasons in category (5). They provide genuine, complete explanations as
to why sentence was reduced. But for the presence of the reason, the
sentence would have been affirmed. These reasons at least suggest that
any sentence falling into one of these categories would as a rule be
reduced.
The cases in category (1) suggest the rule that codefendants who
participated in the crime to the same degree, provided there are no
significant differences in their personal backgrounds, receive the same

sentence. Only if the degree of participation differs significantly or if
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TABLE 15
Reasons Given for Sentence Reductions in Connecticut
Case Nos.

No.

Percent

1. Judge exceeded statutory limit

175, 153

(2)

8.3

2. Out of line with sentence of
codefendants

211,112,176,
539,863,499,
213

(7)

29.2

3. Adult would have received less

120

(1)

4.2

4. Events that superseded trial

187,753

(2)

8.3

5. Sentence "too severe," for a variety
of "reasons"

149,181,182,
184, 317, 284,
285,210,168,
535,186,177

(12)

50.0

(24)

100.0

........

Total ................

other differences obtain, can a different sentence be justified. Here, for
instance, is one such case:
(N] one of the codefendants had a previous poor record with respect to
probation. They were thus entitled to claim an opportunity to show that they
could benefit from a suspended sentence and probation. The defendant, on
the other hand, had previously had the same opportunity with "a prior offense
but had not made anything of the opportunity. The codefendants were
entitled to the same chance that she -had had, and the reason for giving them
that chance was no longer applicable to her.

The distinction between codefendants may also arise, as we have
seen, if one codefendant had accepted a plea offer while the other
defendant, who had rejected it, received after trial a higher sentence;
the division affirmed.
Be that as it may, cases with codefendants have a much better
chance of sentence reduction than other cases and also produce a considerably higher rate of appeal.
TABLE 16
Rate of Sentence Reduction and Appeal in Cases with
and Without Codefendants (Percent)
Massachusetts
With
Without

Reduction ...
Appeal .....

11
38

1
9

Connecticut
Without
With

4
70

1
22
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The reasons in category (5) of table 15 provide at best an incomplete
explanation. The mere citing of mitigating circumstances does not explain why the sentence was modified. Nor do these reasons establish
any rules identifying the types of cases that would be subject to sentence reduction. The part of the reason clearly left out in these opinions is the explicit statement of a standard, at least intuitively experienced by the division, from which the sentence under appeal deviated
too far.
We will have more to say about this problem in section XIII infra,
where we try to assess the general value of stated reasons in sentencing
decisions.
XI.

REASONS FOR REDUCTIONS: MASSACHUSETTS

The Massachusetts Review Board does not give reasons for its decisions; we were, therefore, limited to an effort to infer these reasons.
There follows a brief summary of the twenty cases in our sample in
which the division reduced the sentences; each description is supple60
mented by a list of the mitigating circumstances we could detect.
Case 016
Defendant is a 17-year-old boy, a drug user, with 4 juvenile convictions and
3 adult convictions. Along with three codefendants, he pleaded guilty to robbery charges for which some codefendants received similar sentences (see case
005) and some lighter sentences. This defendant was convicted on 6 counts of
armed robbery and was sentenced to 10-20 years. The sentence was reduced
upon review to 7-20 years.
Mitigating:
-codefendant received lesser sentence
-defendant's age
Case 005
This defendant is one of the codefendants of case 016. Their circumstances
are similar. Defendant in this case is 15 years old, with 9 other convictions, 3
for the same offense as in this case, having a record of prior incarceration and
a record as a heroin user. He pleaded guilty to 4 counts of unarmed robbery
(purse snatching) and 3 counts of armed robbery. He received 10-20 years,
which was reduced to 7-20 years.
Mitigating:
-codefendant received lighter sentence
-defendant's age

60. None of the Massachusetts cases in sections XI and XII are cited by name. The descriptions of the cases include information on criminal history, and the Massachusetts Criminal
History Systems Board does not permit such information to be made public.
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Case 521
Defendant, along with two codefendants, pleaded guilty to one charge of
armed robbery and one count of rape. He was 18 years old, single, with 4
prior juvenile convictions and 1 adult felony conviction, and a prison record.
He received two concurrent sentences of 9-15 years. One codefendant got a
lighter sentence and one a heavier sentence. Upon review, one sentence was
changed to 9-10 years, to run concurrently with the 9-15-year sentence.
Mitigating:
-codefendant received lesser sentence
-defendant's age
Case 491
A 33-year-old man, separated from his wife, pleaded guilty to one charge
of incest with his 13-year-old daughter. He had 3 prior adult convictions,
including felony convictions, and a prior prison record. The original sentence
was 7-12 years. Upon review, his sentence was reduced to 4-12 years. The
wife had a nervous breakdown. No information is provided on the daughter's
state of mind. The defendant appeared very anxious and had emphysema.
Mitigating:
-defendant's healih
Case 302
Defendant was a 26-year-old man, separated from his wife, who had been a
heroin user. He was found guilty by a jury of one count of breaking and
entering with intent to put in fear and commit a felony and one count of
assault and battery with a deadly weapon. He had 6 juvenile convictions and
14 prior adult convictions, 3 for the same offense. His original sentence was
71A-13 years. The division reduced it to 5-10 years.
Mitigating:
-codefendant received lighter sentence
-letters of support from correction officers,
estranged wife, coworkers, and Black
Muslims
Case 307
Defendant was a 43-year-old man, found guilty by a jury of possession of
narcotics with intent to sell. There was some evidence that he had a steady
business in narcotics. He had 7 adult convictions, 2 for the same offense, but
no prior incarceration. His sentence of 8-10 years was reduced to 5-7 years.
Mitigating:
-no prior incarceration
-good employment history as surgical technician
-advanced age
Case 314
Defendant was a 34-year-old Puerto Rican with no criminal record, charged
with assault and battery with a deadly weapon for slashing a woman with a
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knife when she insulted him with racial slurs. The woman's companion
brought out a gun, whereupon the defendant tried to deflect it. At this point,
it fired and killed the offender's brother. The offender began to beat the
woman with a flatiron. She was later further beaten by some other person and
run over by an automobile. The incidents have left the woman in a wheelchair
and with a speech defect.
The defendant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 9-10 years. Upon
review, the SRD reduced the minimum sentence to 2/2 years.
Mitigating:
-no prior record whatsoever
-married, five children
-acted on severe provocation and later
anger over his brother's death
-brother's death was punishment
Case 354
Defendant, 23 years old, pleaded guilty to one count of rape. He had 6
prior convictions, at least one for a felony. He had approached his 22-year-old
victim on the street, threatened her, and then raped her in a parking garage.
Throughout the rape, defendant giggled and laughed, although the psychiatric
report indicated no evidence of psychosis in the defendant. Defendant was
sentenced to 25-35 years. Upon review, sentence was reduced to 10-20 years.
Mitigating:
-reduced mental capacity (notwithstanding
contrary psychiatric report)
Case 390
Defendant, 29 years old, was convicted by a jury of one count of rape. He
had a prior arrest record but no convictions. The original sentence was 12-20
years and was reduced by the division to 9-20 years.
Mitigating:
-no prior convictions
Case 392
Defendant, 26 years old, was found guilty by a jury of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to sell. Sentence was 5-7 years. Upon review
it was reduced to 2 years in the House of Corrections.
Mitigating: -none
Case 394
Defendant, 36 years old, was convicted by a jury of assault and battery
with a deadly weapon. He had 1 prior adult felony conviction and a period of
incarceration. He received a 4-7 year sentence, which was reduced to 2 years
in the House of Corrections.
Mitigating:
-history of seizures
-honorable military discharge
-very low I.Q.
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Case 423
Defendant, single, 20 years old, pleaded guilty to one count of manslaughter and one count of armed robbery. While on escape from the House
of Corrections he committed a robbery with a gun, was chased in his car, and
had an accident, which killed one and injured seven. He had prior convictions,
both juvenile and adult, 1 for manslaughter. He was also a heroin addict. The
original sentence of 18-20 years was reduced to 15-20 years.
Mitigating: -none
Case 153
This defendant is a codefendant of case 152 infra, found guilty of the same
offenses of armed robbery and assault with intent to rob. Defendant, married,
lived in a commune and was a member of the Black Muslims. He was serving a
4-5 year sentence and in this case received a 7-10 year consecutive sentence.
Upon review it was changed to run concurrently with his previous sentence, as
was his codefendant's sentence in case 152.
Mitigating:
-codefendant's sentence was made
concurrent
Case 350
Defendant, 18 years old, black, was found guilty by a jury of 1 count of
rape and 1 count of armed robbery. He had 2 prior juvenile convictions and
no prior prison record.
With two other men, he had attacked the victim in her home. She was a
32-year-old white woman, not known to the defendant. She was threatened
and kicked as well as raped. Defendant and codefendant, case 351, received
life sentences on both charges, to be served consecutively. Upon review, the
life sentence for armed robbery was reduced to 8-10 years; the other life
sentence remained.
Mitigating: -none
Case 351
Defendant is the codefendant of case 350. He is a 20-year-old black, with 2
prior adult convictions, 1 for a felony. His charges, sentences, and sentence
modifications were the same as case 350.
Mitigating: -none
Case 465
Defendant, 19 years old, pleaded guilty to 1 count of armed assault with
intent to commit murder and 1 count of assault and battery with a deadly
weapon. During a period of racial tension, defendant fired a rifle into a
crowd, yelling, "I'm going to get me a nigger." He hit a child, but the child
survived. Defendant was sentenced to 10-20 years on the first count and
10-20 years on the second count, to run concurrently. The second sentence
was reduced to 9-10 years, to run concurrently.
Mitigating: -none
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Case 484
Defendant, 23 years old, married, with four dependents, was charged with
multiple kidnapings and rapes at gunpoint or knifepoint. He was allowed to
plead guilty to one charge of rape and one count of assault with a deadly
weapon. He had 12 prior adult convictions. He was sentenced to 10-20 years
on the rape charge and 5-10 years (concurrent) for the assault. Upon review,
the rape sentence was left unchanged; the assault sentence was reduced to 4-5
years, to run concurrently with the rape sentence.
Mitigating:
-stable employment record
-honorable military discharge
-four dependents
Case 528
Defendant, a 38-year-old woman, separated from her husband, with four
dependents, had no prior record at all when she was charged with murder. She
was quarreling with some other women when a man attempted to separate
them. She lunged at him with a knife and he was killed. Defendant was
pregnant at the time. She was found guilty at a jury trial of manslaughter and
assault and battery with a deadly weapon. Sentence was 3-10 years. The
sentence was suspended by the review division.
Mitigating:
-woman with four dependents
-pregnant at time
Case 435
Defendant, 26 years old, divorced, had a record of 5 prior adult convictions and a prison record. Defendant was indicted for murder when, while at
target practice, he turned, fired on someone he did not know, and killed him.
After the shooting, he turned himself in. He pleaded guilty to 1 count of
manslaughter and 1 count of assault and battery with a deadly weapon. His
original sentence of 12-20 years was reduced to 4-10 years.
Mitigating:
-prior record showed no violent crimes
-no conceivable motive or malice
-turned himself in
Case 152
Defendant, along with two codefendants (case 153 supra) was convicted
after jury trial of armed robbery and assault with intent to rob. He had
already been convicted (with one of the same codefendants in this case) of
kidnaping and assault with intent to murder and was awaiting imprisonment
on this offense with a life sentence. On the present charge, defendant was
sentenced to serve a consecutive sentence of 7-10 years. Upon review, the
term was left unchanged but made concurrent with his life sentence.
Mitigating:
-consecutive sentence to life seemed
extravagant
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Table 17 summarizes the inferred reasons in each case. The harvest,
as can be seen, is unsatisfactory.
TABLE 17
Inferred Reasons for Sentence Reductions in Massachusetts
Codefendant with lighter sentence ....
Health ...............

.........

Poor health ...................
Reduced mental capacity .........
Pregnant ......................
Prior record ...................
No prior record .................
No prior incarceration ...........
No prior conviction ..............
No violent record ...............
Honorable discharge .............
Good employment record .........
Miscellaneous ..................
Great family responsibility ........
Turned himself in ...............
Severe provocation ..............
Consecutive sentence to "life" ........
Suffered death of brother ..........
None discovered ................

No.

Case Nos.
016, 005,521
491,153
..
a

..

.

(5)

Percent
25

(5)

25

491,394
354, 394 a
528 a

(2)
(2)
(1)

314b
307 a
390
435 a
484b
307, a 484b

(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(2)

314,b 484,b
a
528

(3)

15

435 a
314b
152
314b

(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)

5
5
5
5

10
10
5
(7)

35
5
5
5
5
5
10

(7)

392,423,350,
351,465

Total number of cases ..................

35

(5)

25

(20)

100

Average number of reasons per case .........................

1.45

aCase listed under 2 reasons.
bcase listed under 3 or more reasons.

Except for the 5 cases of the 20 in which the different sentence of
a codefendant was the reason for the reduction, the reasons we were
able to infer from these Massachusetts cases are unsatisfactory. That is
to say, the remaining 15 cases (75 percent of all) are the counterpart of
category (5) (sentence too severe) of the corresponding Connecticut
review division, as detailed in table 15, which provides at best an incomplete explanation and at worst none at all.
XII.

SENTENCE INCREASES

In both Massachusetts and Connecticut every sentenced offender is
HeinOnline -- 1977 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 923 1977

924

AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH JOURNAL

1977:881

warned, before his case is reviewed, that the division has the right to
increase his sentence. The provision serves to discourage applications for
review, and our data suggest that this warning serves this purpose.
Appeal rates in Connecticut (which has not increased a sentence since
1963) are higher than in Massachusetts.
Nor is sentence increase a frequent occurrence in Massachusetts.
Only about one in eleven sentence modifications (or about 2 out of
every 1,000 sentences eligible for review) involves a sentence increase.
Since our Massachusetts sample happens to contain no increases,
we had to dip into the past. In Connecticut this was not difficult
because some of these cases had been published. In Massachusetts the
office of the Executive Secretary helped us to find seven cases spanning
6
a time period of fifteen' years. 1
The eight sentence increases in Connecticut involve either particularly vicious crimes or offenders who had committed a great number of
crimes. Typical of the latter category is the Davis case. 6 2 The defendant, who was convicted of attempting to obtain money under false
pretenses, as a second offender received a 1-3 year prison term. Between
1937 and 1958, Davis had been convicted of 18 crimes. One of his
previous convictions had been for the same type of crime and he had
obtained a sentence of 11/2-3 years. The division increased the 1-3 year
term to 2-5 years, stating that the penalty for a second offense must be
more severe than the last penalty received for the same type of crime.
The violent crimes committed by the defendants whose sentences
were increased included rape and assault with intent to murder. 6 3 All
involved the use, or threatened use, of weapons. Several of the incidents
involved serious injury to the victim. Four of the five defendants had at
least one prior felony conviction. The division described the attacks in
several opinions as vicious.
All the seven Massachusetts instances of sentence increase involve
very serious crimes and severe original sentences. The sentence minimum
ranges from 5 years (in three cases) to 15 years (in two cases).
In case 1 of table 18, a dealer in drugs had promised, prior to
sentencing, to cooperate with the prosecutor and the police in identifying the higher-ups in the chain, but subsequently reneged. The
61. We are indebted to John Fiske, the executive secretary of the Massachusetts Superior
Court and to John O'Connor of the Suffolk County Probation Department for their help, and
to Kathy O'Connell who located these seven cases in the Suffolk County file.
62. State v. Davis, 21 Conn. Supp. 480, 158 A.2d 601 (1959).
63. Unpublished opinion (1958); State v. Langley, 22 Conn. Supp. 492, 174 A.2d 689
(1961); State v. Levac, 25 Conn. Supp. 68, 196 A.2d 603 (1963); State v. Rodgers, 23 Conn.
Supp. 83, 176 A.2d 600 (1961); State v. Kohlfuss, 22 Conn. Supp. 278, 169 A.2d 659 (1961).
HeinOnline -- 1977 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 924 1977

No. 4

SEARCH FOR SENTENCING EQUITY

925

defendant in case 2 was convicted of armed robbery with a machine
gun. He too had promised cooperation but when his codefendant came
to trial, he exonerated him. In case 5, the conviction was for assault
with intent to rob. When the defendant appealed, his sentence was
increased from 7-10 years to 8-10 years. We learn that two codefendants received 7-10-year sentences, but that the defendant was the one
who had committed the assault-breaking a bottle over the victim's
head. In the armed robbery case, case 7, the 5-7-year sentence was
increased to 7-10 years. The codefendant had received 10-12 years, so
this seemed a partial adjustment of the discrepancy.
TABLE 18
Sentence Increases in Massachusetts

Case No.

Year

Original
Minimum
Sentence
(Years)

1 .........
2 .........
3 .........
4 .........
5 .........
6 .........
7 .........

1976
1972
1967
1967
1962
1961
1961

8
15
5
7
15
5
5

Average increase ........................

Minimum
Sentence
After
Review
(Years)

Percent
Increase

Crime

12
20
7
8
18
8
7

33
25
40
16
20
60
40

Armed kidnaping
Armed robbery
Drug dealing
Attempted robbery
Rape
Sodomy
Armed robbery

33

In the remaining three cases we have no hint as to what made the
judges take the unusual step. In case 4 the defendant was convicted of
forcible sodomy with a teenager. The board increased his minimum
sentence from 5 to 8 years. Case 3 is, on the record, particularly
puzzling. The defendant was one of three convicted for kidnaping and
armed robbery. All received sentences of 8-15 years. On review, this
defendant, although he had no prior record, had his sentence increased
to 12-15 years. In case 6, a 23-year-old boy raped and severely injured a
22-year-old girl. The defendant had a long record and was on parole
when he committed the current offense. His sentence of 15-20 years
was changed to 18-20 years.
Reasons for increases fall into three discernible categories: increases because the sentence was out of line with that of a codefendant; increases because the offender failed to keep his promise to
cooperate with the prosecution, made prior to the imposition of the
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original sentence; increases because the board considered the original
sentence too low.
Understandably, several offenders whose sentences were increased
in response to their appeal for a reduction subsequently tried to attack
the decision. Four such offenders in Connecticut challenged the constitutionality of the increases, and all four were successful in their efforts
to have the increased sentence set aside-albeit on extraneous grounds
and not because sentence increase after appeal by the defendant was in
itself considered unlawful. Defendant Kohlfuss was not successful in his
first challenge to the sentence increase, in which he argued that an
increase in penalty and resentencing put him twice in jeopardy for the
same crime. 6 4 The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors rejected this
claim as unmeritorious, relying on Kohlfuss's knowledge that his review
could result in a sentence increase and his decision to apply nevertheless
for review. Later, Kohlfuss petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that he had been denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to representation by counsel. The federal court that decided the
case in his favor noted in its opinion that none of the defendants whose
sentences had been increased had been represented by counsel. 6 5 After
the Kohlfuss case, two other prisoners whose sentences had been
increased made the same claim to Connecticut courts and had their
sentence increases set aside.
Another successful attack on the sentence increase was mounted
by a man named Heyward, whose sentence had been ordered increased
from 5-7 to 5-10 years by SRD. 6 6 Because Heyward was not actually
resentenced to the 5-10-year term until the 5-7-year term expired, the
Connecticut Supreme Court granted Heyward's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus and ordered his immediate release on the grounds that his
constitutional (due process and double jeopardy) rights had been vio67
lated by the procedure in this case.
The success of these legal attacks on sentence increases might be
one of the reasons that persuaded the Connecticut review division to
cease increasing sentences.
In Massachusetts, too, offenders who, on application for review,
had their sentences increased tried to obtain redress in court. They were,
however, not successful.
In the most recent of these cases, Gavin v. Commonwealth (with
64.
65.
66.
67.

Kohlfuss v. Warden, 149 Conn. Supp. 692, 183 A.2d 626 (1962).
U.S. ex rel. Kohlfuss v. Reincke, 254 F. Supp. 440 (D. Conn. 1965).
State v. Heyward, unpublished opinion (1958).
State v. Heyward, 152 Conn. Supp. 426, 207 A.2d 730 (1965).
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two companion cases), 6" the offenders claimed that their constitutional
rights had been violated by the division's failure to give a statement of
reasons for its order to increase the sentences. In 1975 the case reached
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which rejected the claim
on the grounds that neither the statute which created the Appellate
Division nor the Constitution required a statement of reasons.
Petitioners had claimed, among other arguments, that North Carolina v. Pearce6 9 was applicable, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held
that:
[W] henever a judge imposes a more
new trial, the reasons for his doing
sons must be based upon objective
duct on the part of the defendant
sentencing proceeding.

severe sentence upon a defendant after a
so must affirmatively appear. Those reainformation concerning identifiable conoccurring after the time of the original

The rationale for the holding was the possibility that "pique at the
'wasted' time and effort and the like, even though subconscious, may in
some degree have motivated the sentence." '
The Massachusetts court
noted that in the instant case there was not even a hint of such a
motive and dismissed the argument.
Decisions to increase the sentence on review, however, are open to
another kind of suspicion. The statute empowering the division to
increase the sentence at its discretion was enacted for a purpose: namely, to discourage applications for review of every eligible sentence. It
could therefore be argued that the division is determined to have at
least one or two increases each year in order to reaffirm the reality of
the threat; moreover, if deterrence of applications without merit is a
motive, the division might increase the proportion of lengthened sentences in years where more cases are brought before it. The available
figures give no support to either of these suspicions.
Table 19 shows that the highest percentage of sentence increases
occurred in 1970, when the number of cases heard was at a minimum
(66); that during one year (1969) there was not a single increase; and
that during 1973, the year with the second highest caseload (267), there
was but one increase.

68. Gavin v. Commonwealth, 327 N.E.2d 707 (1975), aff'd sub nom. Gavin v. Chernoff,
546 F.2d 457 (1st Cir. 1976). Information on these cases was obtained from Justice Kaplan,
who wrote the opinion for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts denying the offenders'
right to redress of their sentence increases.
69. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
70. Gavin v. Commonwealth, 327 N.E.2d 707, 710 (1975), aff'd sub nom. Gavin v.
Chernoff, 546 F.2d 457 (1st Cir. 1976).
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TABLE 19

Patterns of Dispositions in Massachusetts, 1969-73a (Percent)
1969
(N = 107)

Sentence
Affirmed ...
Reduced ...
Increased ...
Total

...

1970
(N = 66)

84
16
--100

1971
(N = 109)

1972
(N = 386)

78
17
5

74
23
3

83
15
2

100

100

100

1973
(N = 267)
87
13
*

100

Source: See note 46 supra.
a Fiscal years.
* Less than half of 1 percent (one case).

There is, nevertheless, a lingering feeling that not all is right with
the decisions to increase a sentence, even if there is a good reason for it

in the individual case. The division, after all, sees only the upper part of
the sentence spectrum. The judges, therefore, do not see all or even
nearly all offenders whose original sentences were "too low." It is safe
to assume that the bulk of the too-low sentences must be among the
sentences that never come before the division. Whenever the division
increases a sentence, it increases one of the severe sentences, which it
did not consider severe enough. The average minimum sentence of the
seven Massachusetts sentence increases studied was 8 years.
XIII. THE VALUE OF STATED "REASONS"

The case for having the review division state its reasons was
engagingly made by Justice Kaplan, writing for the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in the Gavin case, which ultimately held that
the absence of a statement of reasons did not void an imposed sentence
increase:
On the affirmative side, it may be suggested that the preparation of such a
statement would provide a test for the judges themselves, and for the prisoner
also, of the soundness of the judges' reasoning.... The statement would be
some guaranty that the decision was not capricious or arbitrary, a safeguard
perhaps especially needed if the decision to resentence is indeed "final." We
can recognize that there is more than mere sentimental attractiveness in the
idea that an explanation is "owed" to the prisoner on whom a harsher sentence has been imposed after he has pleaded for a reduction; if the explanation would not help materially in his rehabilitation, it would at least symbolize that he was being treated as a person rather than a cipher. A statement
of reasons might usually be more easily written by the Appellate Division for
revising a sentence than by the trial judge for imposing the original sentence,
since the former would be a more focused analysis looking to correction of
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possible misjudgment embodied in the sentence reviewed rather than to the
1
formation of an original judgment. 1

Much depends on whether reason statements can be formulated that
fulfill this explanatory function. Justice Kaplan had his doubts, and we
shall return to them later on.
The precise question to address here is what logical structure reasons must have in order to provide a satisfactory explanation. Let us
begin with some of the satisfactory explanations we have found in the
present study. When the division increases a sentence and, for instance,
states:
This sentence will be increased because it is smaller than the last sentence this
offender received for a similar crime,

we have been given a full explanation. If the division states:
This sentence will not be changed since it was agreed to by the defendant
when he pleaded guilty,

we have been given a full explanation. If the division states:
This sentence is being reduced so as to equal the lower sentence a codefendant has received whose criminal responsibility in this was not less than the
petitioner's and whose record was comparable,

we have been given a full explanation. If the Massachusetts division
(which does not make statements of reasons) would have stated (in case
The sentence of this appellant will be increased because at the time .of sentencing he promised cooperation with the prosecutor, a promise he did not
keep,

we would have had a full explanation.
All four explanations-as would all full explanations-have this in
common: they express or imply a rule of which the instant case is a
special application.
If circumstance X, or the combination of circumstances X, Y, and Z are
present, the review division will act in the indicated manner.

The rule, much like the holding in a court opinion, may have been
established earlier and only reapplied in the instant case. The rule would
provide an "explanation" even if it should be considered unfair. Sup71. See id. at 712-13.
72. See text at table 18.
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pose the Massachusetts division were to state (as it might truthfully in
some cases):
The sentence will stand because we do not reduce, as a rule, any sentence that
does not exceed 5 years,

we would have a full explanation.
All these rules into which the full explanations could be translated
have another characteristic in common. They contain fairly precise prescriptions as to the type of sentencing decision to make and whether to
affirm, reduce, or increase the sentence.
In contrast, we now turn to examples of reasons that fail to provide a full explanation, and at times any explanation. There follow
some reason statements in cases in which the division affirmed the
sentence:
-

-

We cannot say that the sentence imposed is out of line.
We cannot say that the sentence is too harsh.
There is nothing wrong with the sentences that are within the statutory
limits. Nor can the division say that the sentencing judge exceeded his
discretionary authority.
There are no facts appearing to give countenance to any abuse of discretion
by the sentencing judge in imposing the sentence, which did not exceed the
statutory limits for the offense charged.

Following is the complete text of an unusually detailed statement
of facts and reasons:
On June 6, 1974, as a result of a plea of guilty, the petitioner received a
sentence of not less than eight nor more than twenty years for the crime of
manslaughter in the first degree in violation of Public Act No. 73-137, Section
9(a)(3) of the 1973 Public Acts of the General Assembly.
On March 5, 1974, the petitioner had an argument with his girl friend,
striking her in the face. On March 6, 1974, the victim, who was also seeing
the same girl, noticed that her face was swollen and told her to talk to the
petitioner about leaving her alone. The following day, the victim went to
, where the petitioner was employed, to speak to him
about the girl. They got into an argument, which continued for some time,
and glasses and chairs were broken. The petitioner took a gun from behind
the bar but put it back. Both parties to the argument went outside. They then
continued their argument inside. The petitioner again took the gun from
behind the bar and shot the victim. The victim expired as a result of two
gunshot wounds.
The petitioner has no criminal record, except for a conviction for disorderly conduct. He is remorseful. His attorney urged the court to impose a five
year minimum.
The victim had no weapon and had not been drinking. The blood alcohol
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was negative. The State's Attorney recommended the sentence imposed by the
court. The sentencing judge felt that the recommendation was a fair one.
The fact that a human life has been taken is an important element in
sentencing. The division cannot say that the sentence was unreasonable or
severe. It is within statutory limits. It must
stand.
73
Accordingly, the sentence is affirmed.

None of these statements provides any explanation. This can best be
seen if we take the liberty of slightly rearranging this opinion:
as a result of a plea of guilty, the petitioner received a sentence of not less
than eight ...years....
The victim had no weapon and had not been drinking. The blood alcohol
was negative. It is true that the State's Attorney recommended the sentence
imposed by the court and that the sentencing judge felt that the recommendation was a fair one. The fact that a human life has been taken is an important
element in the sentencing.
On the other hand, the petitioner has no criminal record, except for a
conviction for disorderly conduct. He is remorseful. His attorney urged the
court to impose a five-year minimum.
In view of these important mitigating circumstances, the division felt that
justice would be better served if petitioner's minimum sentence were reduced
to five years.
It is so ordered.
...

We have left the statements of mitigating and aggravating circumstances untouched, merely reversed their order, but we have changed
the conclusion. One decision would have been as plausible as the other.
Since no rule is invoked either way, the enumeration of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances is of little relevance. As long as there are
some of each, they can support either decision. Neither would be based
on a discernible rule.
The criterion, of course, goes only to the statement of the reasons,
not to the reasons themselves. The division, unless it acts capriciously,
which would be an unfair assumption, operates in all these cases under
the rule it expressed in case 182:
This sentence is too severe when compared to others convicted of the same
offense with similar histories.

This is a satisfactory explanation except that the proof is missing. In a
rudimentary way we have attempted to supply that proof in table 20.
In table 20 we have put side by side the original sentence in the
cxse, the ordered reduced sentence, and the average for cases of this
73. Unpublished decision (1974).
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TABLE 20
Reduction of Sentence Minimum as Compared to Average for "Comparable" Casesa
(Massachusetts)

Case No.

Reduction
(Years)
From
To

Average Sentence for "Comparable" Cases
(Years)

Case

Reduction
with Regard
to Average

016 ....

10

7

5

Guilty plea to armed robbery,
prior record (no incarceration)

toward

005 ....

10

7

6

toward

521 ....

15

10

Guilty plea to armed robbery,
prior record of incarceration
Max. sentence for guilty plea to
armed robbery, prior record of
incarceration

(max.)

10

toward

302 ....

7/2

5

5

Assault and battery with deadly
weapon, prior record of incarceration

toward

307 ....

8

5

6

Possession with intent to sellclass A, no prior record

beyond

314 ....

9

2Y

6

Assault with deadly weapon, after
jury trial, no prior record

beyond

Rape, prior record

toward

390 ....

10
9

Rape, no prior record

toward

392 ....

3

Possession with intent to sellclass B

beyond

354 ....

394 ....

4

2

8

Assault and battery with deadly
weapon, jury conviction, prior
prison record

away from

423 ....

18

15

14

Sum of average for manslaughter
and average for robbery, major
record

toward

435 ....

12

4

8

Manslaughter, without violent
record

beyond

350 ....

life

8

5

Guilty plea to armed robbery,
prior record (no incarceration)

toward

351

life

8

5

Guilty plea to armed robbery,
prior record (no incarceration)

toward

465 ....

10

9

6

Assault and battery with deadly
weapon, prior record

toward

484 ....

5

4

5

Assault, guilty plea, felony
record

away from

....

aCases for which comparable cases existed and hence averages could be meaningfully
computed.
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sort. The juxtapositions are crude, because our inventory of cases was
small. For the 16 (out of 20) cases for which we could compute at least
some tentative averages, 10 modifications moved toward them; 4 moved
toward the average but stopped beyond it so that the reduced sentence
ended up below the average for the category. In only two cases did the
reduction move away from the average.
But if table 20 is a true representation of the principle by which
the division is guided in these decisions, then it is clear that a complete
statement of reasons must contain some of these crucial numbers which
would then form a more important part of the explanation than words
can provide. Word-reasons are full explanations only when they refer to
operating rules that translate mitigating and aggravating circumstances
into points on a sentencing scale. Justice Kaplan saw the point
74
clearly:
If our statutes provided fixed substantive rules as to the imposition of appellate review of sentences, then a statement of reasons could help to determine
whether the rules were being followed or a given sentence was right. Whether
or to what extent sentencing can or should be submitted to such substantive
rules need not be debated here. The fact is that our sentencing conforms to
the old and still conventional model without fixed rules (apart from those
establishing durational or similar limits of sentences) that allows very. wide
discretion to the trial judge. Thus an explanatory statement at the time of
sentencing would serve no sharp analytic purpose [emphasis added].

An example of such a translation rule for sentences is the rule

established by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia:
While the jury is permitted to consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it must find and identify at least one statutory aggravating factor
before it may impose the penalty of death.'75

But such sentencing provisions are the exception, not the rule.
A developed appellate system of sentencing review with reasoned
opinions can undoubtedly do better than the rudimentary beginnings in
Connecticut. Yet even a developed system can have only a limited scope
unless it establishes rules that translate circumstances into points on the

sentencing scale.7 6
74. Gavin v. Commonwealth, 327 N.E.2d 707, 713 (1975), aff'd sub nom. Gavin v.
Chernoff, 546 F.2d 457 (1st Cit. 1976).
75. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206.
76. The Austrian Minister of Justice, Dr. Christian Broda, has commissioned a study of the
Austrian sentence appellate system which gives broad appellate rights to both the defendant and
the prosecutor. It will be instructive to see the results of that study.
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In this context the English experience is of interest. It would
appear that the intelligence imparted through the case-by-case decisions
of the Court of Appeals provided the raw material for guidelines but
not the guidelines themselves, for they were developed in a scholarly
book, Principles of Sentencing, by David Thomas]'7 He has distilled
from the collected decisions of the Court of Appeals what one might
call "the tariff" for a great variety of specific crime-offender combina8
tions. Trial judges, we are told, keep the book handy.7
XIV. THE SEARCH FOR EQUITY

The sentencing review board was created in an effort to curb sentence disparity in our criminal courts. Informal sentencing seminars and
sentencing councils7 9 prior to imposing sentence are others. American
law does not know as yet the independent appeal of the sentence to a
higher court. All these efforts aim directly or indirectly at reducing
sentence disparity at the trial level either by ad hoc modification or,
more importantly-if less frequently, by developing sentencing guidelines.
The basic structure of the sentencing process is simple. The first
decision is between incarcerating the offender or letting him "walk" by
imposing a fine, probation, suspended sentence, or any other available
variant that fulfills this purpose. The second decision concerns the
length of incarceration, if incarceration is decided upon.
The basic need is for guidelines that translate specific crime-offender combinations into these decision issues. Occasionally the law does
this by having special sentences for degrees of aggravation or for offenders with different prior records. What is needed are systematic guidelines
that cover not only special situations but all possible combinations.
Such guidelines, if they are to reduce disparity, must be specific
enough to identify comparable cases and flexible enough not to do
violence to the sentencing judge's need for differentiation.
Merely requiring reasons from the sentencing judge or from the
review board is unlikely to help much, as the Connecticut experience
77. David A. Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of
Appeal Criminal Division (London: Heinemann Educational Books, Ltd., 1970).
78. Here ends our review of the sentencing review procedures in Massachusetts and Connecticut. Our findings are not complete. We have as yet no measure of the sentence disparity in
these courts. We would like to know how disparity changes over time, especially whether service
on the review board tends to reduce disparity when these judges impose sentence in the trial
courts. We would also like to know more about the board's own view of its role and how it
goes about making its decisions.
79. See note 4 supra.
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shows. Genuine guidelines must relate specific offender-crime combinations to the sentencing decisions.
The important pioneering work toward this goal has been done by
Leslie Wilkins and his associates." 0 The principle underlying that work
is simple: find out what the judges in fact do; see whether their actions
show any discernible pattern; then establish that pattern as a guideline.
Table 21, freely adapted from Wilkins's work for the present purpose,
shows how such guidelines might look. The point scores for offender
and crime reflect the circumstances the judges actually take into consideration. The offender score is primarily determined by the past criminal record, if any; the crime score reflects both the seriousness of the
type of offense and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the
particular case.
TABLE 21
Suggested Maximum Sentence
Offender Score
1-5

6-10

11-15

16-20

21-25

Q

1-5
6-10

Walk
Walk

Walk
Walk

Walk
Walk

Walk
4 yrs.

4 yrs.
6 yrs.

Q

11-15

Walk

Walk

4 yrs.

6 yrs.

8 yrs.

16-20

Walk

4 yrs.

6 yrs.

8 yrs.

10 yrs.

21-25

4 yrs.

6 yrs.

8 yrs.

10 yrs.

15 yrs.

Guidelines, of course, are no more than that; they are not mandatory rules. One of the bills now pending in the Congress 8 ' intends to
foster acceptance by imposing a twofold burden on the judge who
deviates from the guidelines: the judge must give reasons for the deviation, and the sentence may be appealed.
The construction of guidelines involves a number of problems: the
Wilkins guidelines have no lower sentence limit and therefore bypass the
problem of a possible sentence appeal by the prosecutor. Traditionally,
American and English law does not allow the prosecutor to appeal a
80. Leslie T. Wilkins et al., Sentencing Guidelines: Structuring Judicial Discretion (mimeographed 1976); Leslie T. Wilkins, Perspectives on Court Decision-making, in Don M. Gottfredson, ed., for National Institute of Mental Health, Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency,
Decision-making in the Criminal Justice System: Reviews and Essays 59 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975).
81. S. 1437, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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sentence as too low. In Canada, the Crown with leave from the court
may appeal a sentence. England, however, allows the court to increase a
sentence imposed by the Magistrate Court that was appealed by the
defendant.
Another problem arises from the need for periodic revision of the
guidelines. Recent years, for instance, have brought sharp upward shifts
in sentencing patterns, most of them within the unbounded discretion
of the present laws. The necessary periodic revisions might not only
affect the numbers in the body of the guideline table but also the point
values that compose the scores of offender and crime.
Withal, acceptance of elaborate sentencing rules, however desirable
a goal, might not be achieved easily. The basic problem is to make the
judges see the problem of lateral disparity and encourage them to
reduce it. And since such an adjustment may conflict with the judge's
personal sense of justice, a more modest beginning might be a useful
first step. We would propose that all judges about to impose sentence
be made aware of the sentence pattern that their court or the system as
a whole imposes in cases involving that particular crime-offender combination. The particular combinations should perhaps appear in their
original descriptive form, not as yet in point scores; in the mathematical
transformation, important concreteness is lost.
One might begin the crime classification with the broad categories
that some of the penal codes have established, such as the Federal Penal
Code or the Penal Law of New York State. The latter, for instance,
distinguishes among felonies A, B, C, D, and E, misdemeanors A and B,
violations, and infractions. As a next step one could perhaps refine
these broad classifications by distinguishing particularly the now very
important violent crimes.
One might begin the offender classification by accepting the traditional crime record distinction of no prior record, arrests only, 8 2 convictions without incarcerations, and prior incarcerations. Successive
refinements, which depend in part on a sufficiently large number of
available cases, would enable a judge to see, for instance, what sentences
his court imposed on a convicted store burglar who had a record of
prior incarcerations for similar crimes.
There is no need to make any of these classifications or combina-

82. We are bypassing the important issue as to whether a record of arrests only should be at
all distinguished from no record.
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tions permanent. Even without the use of a computer, they can be
changed easily; with a computer, they can be changed instantaneously.8 3
The operation would begin by assembling all sentences for a given
category as shown in figure 1.

Z Z J =1

sentence

/\

/

6m..

Probation

Fine

up to
6 m.

3\

over 6 m.
to
1 y.

up to
2 y.

up to
3 y.

y

up to
4 y.

up to
5

longer

y.

Fig. 1. Assembling the Sentences Imposed by the Court for Specific Crime-Offender Combinations.

Just what these distributions will look like is impossible to predict.
They might approximate any of the four prototypes shown in figure 2.
They may be symmetrically distributed, as in (a) of figure 2;
skewed at the lower or upper limit of the sentencing frame, as in (b); or
even bimodal, as in (c), when judges are so far apart from each other
that some gave the minimum and some the maximum sentence. It is, of
course, quite possible that for some offender-crime combinations there
is no such thing as a prevalent pattern for a court, only a diversity so
great that the distribution curve has no peak and remains flat, as in (d).
This type of sentencing pattern provides no guidance to the judge who
would like to conform. But such a curve should be a signal that sentencing
is so much in need of help that remedial planning is in order.

83. From the record of such entries we could learn more precisely what case characteristics
judges use in their sentencing decicions.
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Complete Dispersion
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......
.......
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.......
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Fig. 2. The Type of Possible Distributions

Once the distributions are established, they should be converted to
a percent basis so as to make them comparable, irrespective of the
different number of cases they might contain. Next, one might consider
spelling out the average (mean) sentence and certain specified ranges, as
shown in figure 3.
The availability of such sentence distributions for all crime-offender combinations would facilitate the task of the review board; the distributions would replace with hard figures the heretofore intuitive and
hence vague Gestalt perceptions that normally inform the review
process.
These distributions should also be welcome information for the
trial judges because they would put the lateral disparity problem permanently before them. While some judges might not care, most of them
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I

Mean

I

25%

25%

below
the
Mean

above
the
Mean

15%

15%

10%

10%
Total Range

Legal
Lower
Limit

Legal
Upper
Limit

Fig. 3. Grouping the Distribution of Sentences Imposed By the Court for a Specific CrimeOffender Combination.

would appreciate permanent visibility of the problem and the implied
gentle nudgings toward reducing disparity. 8 4 Whatever these distribu84. From time to time the judges might care to see even more specifically how their own
sentencing pattern compares with those of their colleagues.
Judge A,- ....

J
/
I

Judge
B
/.
eJudgec

/

S

\

"I
//

Average
All Judges
Fig. 4. Sentence Distributions of Individual Judges for Specific Crime-Offender Combinations.
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tions show-whether a prevalent pattern or rampant disparity-they will
provide important information. Having this information will not resolve
the disparity problem, but it will help to narrow its dimensions. Looking at the actual sentencing pattern will be a useful first step toward the
development and eventual acceptance of specific guidelines, either by
building up the prevalent pattern, or by reforming it, or in some cases
possibly by beginning to establish it.
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